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The “Politics of Trauma”: National Trauma in Poland and Hungary and the Othering of Queer
Identities
By Keira Hoeferle
Abstract:The governments of Poland and Hungary, under the parties Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
(Law and Justice) and Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats), respectively, have deliberately
implemented policies and utilized rhetoric to marginalize the LGBT+ community, a dramatic
reversal from years of social progress in the European Union. In investigating this shift, prior
scholars have explored social factors and authoritarian, populist politics as causes, yet these
cannot explain the extent and viciousness to which both parties attack sexual and gender
minorities. In this paper, I demonstrate that both governments have utilized “national trauma”
to construct a nationalist space that excludes LGBT+ people, upholstered by a justifying
narrative. I argue that these parties have heavily invested in creating a social and cultural
infrastructure endorsing their interpretation of past collective trauma. They then use appeals to
this trauma to depict LGBT+ people as existential threats to the nation, before exonerating
themselves from consequential blame through similar appeals to victimhood. These “politics of
trauma”are instrumental in analyzing how states frame and organize intergroup identity
aggressively, which is visible through a rise in anti-LGBT+ violence in both countries.
The New Order (Prologue)
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The New Order: A Europe Drowning in Trauma and Flooded with Hatred
“A new order is being born. In our world, in our lives as well, great changes are banging at our
gates. We have seen our losses as irresistible setbacks for centuries. In the absence of our own
strength, we expected a wonderful rescue army to come from the fog of legends, which would
change the fate of Hungarians… Let us not be afraid of what we see: we are the ones we have
been waiting for. We are the ones reversing the fate of Hungary.”
- Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary (2010-Present), at the Commemoration of the
Calvary of Sátoraljaújhely, June 6th 2020.1
“The plans will be presented soon. They are really ambitious, far-reaching… We will present the
‘Polish New Order.’”
- Jarosław Kaczyński, Leader of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość and Deputy Prime Minister of
Poland, in an interview with Telewizja w Polsce, January 21st, 2021.
The 2019 Equality March (as they are known in Hungary and Poland, where phrases like
“Pride Parade” court immodesty) in Białystok was, for Western Europe, a stunning example of
clashing identities. For the people of Poland, however, it proved another climax in a long
procession of hatred seeping back decades. The participants of the March, held in a city that had
suffered Tsarist, Nazi, and Soviet subjugation for centuries, looked no different from the LGBT+
members of Hannover or Milan. One girl, documented in video, holds a sign proclaiming, in
English: “I have the power of gays and anime on my side,” stressing not only her Internet
literacy through a meme popular in LGBT+ online spaces, but her membership to a global queer
community.2 She is one in a procession trundling down the city’s historic streets, protected by
police fully equipped in riot gear. Outside the police cordon, one can hear slurs and obscenities
1
2

Orbán, Viktor. “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Commemoration Speech.” About Hungary, June 6 2020.
“Marsz Równości w Białymstoku,” Radio Bialystok, July 20 2019, 2:11.
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charged at the Marches from the mass of counter-protestors circling them like vultures, hurling
stones, bottles, and bricks. As individual members are pulled from the procession and quickly
surrounded by a torrent of abuse, the riot police fire dozens of tear gas canisters into the outside
crowd chanting nationalist slogans, bathing the uplifting music from the truck in screams of pain
and terror (see Apendix, Figure A).3
While the Western media looked on in outrage,4 its Russian counterparts embraced the
nationalists, celebrating their “struggle against Western decadence.”5 The Polish government,
under the party leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice,
PiS), was placed in a bind; as it was an unspoken fact that the counter-protests were spurred on
by the ruling party. Many of the counter-protestors and members of the “March for Normalcy”
came from outside the city. Beyond the reach of Białystok’s centrist mayor, the larger
voivodeship declared itself Strefy wolne od LGBT, or an “LGBT Free Zone,” to the public
support of local PiS officials. Equality Marches had carried a long history of violence, from the
2018 Lublin March where counterprotestors were arrested for handling homemade explosives, to
the 2007 Kraków “Tolerance March,” where footage of police dragging away screaming
marchers reached international ears. Yet this environment had been tacitly approved by
Kaczyński himself, whose brother had once banned such Marches during his tenure as Mayor of
Warsaw6. Their party had long maintained ties to militant groups like Młodzież Wszechpolska
(All-Polish Youth), famous for stalking Equality Marches with slogans like “Gas the fags” and
batons. Clearly at a loss, Kaczyński denounced the actions of both sides, and his government did
little else.
More senior Wesern journalists connected Białystok to the anti-LGBT+ violence of a
decade prior, the era of mass “moral panic” and fierce resistance to the social justice inherent to
Europeanization. They had, wrongly, believed that the sights of riot police at Equality Marches
would remain in the realm of memory. New polls, however, reported a stunning reverse of the
trends towards greater tolerance once recorded. Public intolerance had grown, with 68% of
LGBT+ Poles claiming that discrimination against them had gotten worse in the past five years.7
It represented a stark failure not only for the LGBT+ rights movement, but the entire human
rights regime the European Union had adopted in Lisbon. With PiS winning reelection a year
after, on a campaign built around homophobia, the crisis of anti-LGBT discrimination began to
boil into a fever pitch.

“Hooligans attack LGBT Pride Parade in Bialystok. Zamieszki na Marszu Równości w Białymstoku 2019,”
Aktywista - Bart Staszewski, July 21 2019, 3:11.
4 John, Tara., “A city's first pride march was meant to be a day of joy. The far right turned it into chaos.,” CNN, July
28 2019.
5 Poland: Nationalist protesters stage ‘March of Normality’ in Bialystok.” Ruptly, Sep 20, 2020.
6 Graff, Agnieszka. “We Are (Not All) Homophobes: A Report from Poland.” Feminist Studies, vol. 32, no. 2, 2006,
pp.434-449. Kaczyński himself said of the March, “I am not willing to meet perverts. All Poles have the right to
demonstrate, but not as homosexuals.”
7 “Memorandum on the stigmatization of LGBTI people in Poland.” The Commissioner for Human Rights, The
Council of Europe, 2020.
3
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The bill signed by János Áder, Hungary’s President, on May 28, 2020, was remarkably
simple on its surface. It provides a legal definition for the word nem (sex), once vaguely referred
to in anti-discrimination and medical laws, as “biological sex based on primary sex
characteristics and chromosomes.” Once sex is assigned at birth, the law argues, it is as
immutable as the chromosomes in one’s genes. It was in such language that the Hungarian
government, helmed by the Fidesz (Alliance of Young Democrats) party that controls 2/3rds of
the nation’s parliament, that an entire population of transgender and intersex Hungarians was
legally erased.8 Theoretically, transgender and intersex people could still live under an identity of
their choosing, but that identity was, in the eyes of the state, illegitimate. It could not raise a
family, it could not claim discrimination, it could not participate in Hungary’s democratic
institutions. The Hungarian government ensured that its transgender and intersex citizens could
never escape their pasts.
The Western media turned immediately to Viktor Orbán, a founder of Fidesz and then
serving his fourth term as Prime Minister. Orbán had already become a household name outside
of Hungary, both for the success of his self-entitled “illiberal democratic” rule and his
controversial statements and policies surrounding the 2015 Migrant Crisis, where he declared
Muslim migrants an existential threat to Hungary.9 Many journalists already felt that Orbán’s
demagoguery had found a new target. After all, it was Orbán himself, using emergency powers
he had been granted to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, who presented the “transgender ban” to
the National Assembly on the Transgender Day of Visibility.10 The eyes of Europe once again
fell to him.
The next statement from the Prime Minister Fidesz posted to its English website,
however, had little to do with the bill. If anything, Orbán would argue that the entire nation of
Hungary, not just its formerly transgender citizens, could not escape its own past, or the
hardships it once endured. Orbán spoke at the Commemoration of the Calvary of Sátoraljaújhely,
a monument in a community that was split in half by the Treaty of Trianon in 1919 when the
treaty forged a new, Slovakian state (see Appendix, Figure B). It symbolizes just one of the
nations many hardships:
“We see hundreds of wandering tribes of the great steppe disappear and perish in the
dust of history. We see that we Hungarians have neither disappeared nor perished… We fended
off the attacks of Western empires one after the other. We recovered from the devastating blows
of the Eastern pagans. We did what the other peoples of the steppe could not. We fought, we
organized, we adapted and we kept our place in Europe.”
The Treaty, in Orbán’s words, was a “rape of Central Europe” orchestrated by the West,
the latest in a long line of betrayals he warns Hungary must neither forget or forgive, even if all
parties now co-exist in one Union.

Knight, Kyle, and Gall, Lydia. “Hungary Ends Legal Recognition of Transgender and Intersex People.” Human
Rights Watch, May 21 2020.
9 Thorpe, Nick. “The Man Who Thinks Europe has been Invaded.” BBC, 6 Apr 2018
10Knight and Gall, 2020.
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“There have been many who wished to bury Hungary, there were those who always hated
Hungarians. Today, there is no Czechoslovakia, no Yugoslavia nor a Soviet Union. There is no
British or French empire. And what’s left of them is now twisting in the multicultural grip of
their vindictive colonies… They said it well a hundred years ago: we will be there at the funeral
of those who wanted to put us in the grave. There is not a single nation in the world that could
have endured [what we have]. But we are stubborn, tough and resourceful, therefore we have
not only endured, but today we are winning again… Only one who knows the way of hardship,
who can stand the test, who understands that truth is worth little without power, can have a great
nation.”
It is with that knowledge in mind, that Orbán gives this warning:
“History is not merciful. It does not forgive weakness. If we are not up to the task, we are
lost. If we listen to the kind hearted, we are lost. If we give in to the forces of disintegration, we
are lost. Hungarians can never afford the luxury of weakness again. We can only have what we
can protect. This is the law and this is our destiny.”11
That, ultimately, is what Viktor Orbán believes “the new order” must be: a state strong
enough to protect itself from the conquests of the past and the conquerors of the future. The “new
order” must be ready, without hesitation, to cut all those who it cannot save, and all those who do
not belong. The bill Orbán presented made it clear who he had in mind.
Introduction
“Let’s not be misled by the brutal propaganda of homosexual’s postures of tolerance. It is a kind
of madness, and for that madness, our rule will indeed be for them a dark night.”
- Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski, Polish Minister of Culture, October 3rd 2005.
“Let’s stop listening to these idiocies about human rights. These [LGBT+] people are not equal
to normal people.”
- Przemysław Czarnek, Voivode of Lublin and Polish Minister of Education and Science,
in a live broadcast as part of the 2020 Presidential campaign, June 14th, 2020.
“I want to show my community that we no longer have to live in fear… People who have not
lived the lives of the LGBT community in this country should not judge us, and nobody should be
surprised if we are eventually forced to take things into our own hands.”
- Małgorzata Szutowicz, known internationally as Margot, founder of the queer anarchist
Stop Bzdurom (Stop the Bullshit), shortly after her release from prison, September 21st,
2020.
The growth of homophobia and transphobia in Poland and Hungary, often encouraged
and legislated by the state, represent a distinct challenge for the EU. Europe is no stranger to
divisive politics and political crises - the years between 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic have
been characterized by them. Rather, the nature of Fidesz and PiS’ attacks on human rights,
democratic norms, and the protection of minorities target the Union’s own purported values,
11

Orbán, 2020.
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rather than its interstate unity or financial stability. As both parties engage in brinkmanship,
pushing their hatred deeper into the public while gauging the tepidity of international reaction,
the human rights that have defined Europe for decades are increasingly challenged by their own
members.12
It is easy to dismiss these events as moral backlash from socially conservative and largely
religious countries, informed by the immense homophobia that was commonplace among former
Warsaw Pact members. On inspection, however, discrepancies emerge: by all accounts, the
period of violent reprisals and immense government opposition to queer rights has already
occurred, during the major visibility campaigns that corresponded with Poland and Hungary’s
accession to the EU.13 Into the 2010s, the situation improved: public support grew, legal
protections were put in place, and government hostility largely dwindled. The surge of antiLGBT+ sentiment, then, is a stunning reversal, that reaches to the highest levels of power. It is
important to stress that there is nothing “typical” in the politics of Fidesz and PiS towards the
LGBT+ community, nor in the organized, persistent, and aggressively hostile environment these
governments have built.
My research initially examined the development of Fidesz and PiS as parties seeking the
construction of a “new nationalism” that would redefine Hungarian and Polish national
belonging and exclude queer citizens from it. I examined the efforts of these governments to
frame the LGBT+ community as unrepresentative and existentially opposed to the “Christian”
and “family friendly” Hungarian and Polish nations, often in ways that directly appealed to
Fidesz and PiS voter bases. Through alliances with a dogmatically bigoted Church, securitizing
the protection of families and minors, and forcibly shutting down discourse about LGBT+ rights,
both parties have found success in turning large portions of their populations against the LGBT+
community.
My research also demonstrated how vicious, paranoid, and ungrounded many of the
perspectives these governments displayed were, to such a magnitude as to actively hinder the
pursuit of these parties' other interests. PiS’ conspiracy-theory-laden and “vulgar” bigotry turned
away voters in 200714; Poland and Hungary’s diplomatic relations are constantly threatened by
their hardline attitude, further alienating them from the EU that neither can afford exiting. As
“state homophobia/transphobia” is so demonstrable, I chose to realign my paper in understanding

“Justice Minister: EP Resolution on LGBTQ Rights for Same Sex Marriage, ‘Completely Unfounded.’” About
Hungary, 16 Sep 2021. We can clearly see Hungary responding to the EU’s own response towards the “Child
Protection Act,” which will be explored later.
13 Renkin, Hadley Z. “Perverse Frictions: Pride, Dignity, and the Budapest Pride March.” Ethnos, vol. 80, no. 3,
2015, pp. 409-432.The All-Polish Youth, then tied to the Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) has
already been mentioned. In Hungary, many so-called “hooligans” were attached to the then-far-right party Jobbik
Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary), now a centre-right opposition party.
14 Graff, Agnieszka. “Report from the Gender Trenches: War Against ‘Genderism’ in Poland.” European Journal of
Women’s Studies, vol. 21, no. 2014.
12
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its apparent success: what makes it so vicious, and why has it captured notoriously untrusting
and cynical voters with such force?15
Theories about such quandries abound across the scholarship of international relations,
political science, queer and gender studies. However, none of these approaches, divided as they
are across disciplines and often focusing more on Fidesz and PiS’ authoritarianism, can
individually offer an adequate analysis of how these parties have effectively mobilized their
voters. Some also lack proper historical and cultural contexts on where this sentiment is rooted;
and, further, how those contexts are utilized by both governments.
In attempting to provide such an analysis, my paper employs a constructivist approach
built around the concept of “national trauma,”still a fledgling in international political discourse.
“National trauma,” as shall be elaborated further, is the collective interpretation of traumatic
events from the nation’s history, contextualized within a “trauma narrative” that becomes the
principal vector of one’s national belonging. This “chosen trauma” permeates through the
cultural and political fabric of the nation, and is applied to modern contexts and insecurities. This
paper will demonstrate how the Polish and Hungarian governments have consciously created and
propagated “trauma narratives” that then provide justification for greater hostility to LGBT+
rights. To do this, I will first examine the historical and cultural contexts that allowed these
“chosen traumas” to develop, and how both governments have utilized their power to align key
societal sectors to reinforce these narratives. I will then explore how this same infrastructure is
used to justify and target LGBT+ discrimination, how national trauma allows these governments
to exonerate and export wrongdoing away from their policies.
LGBT+ rights in Poland and Hungary do not exist in political independence, but intersect
with numerous social, economic, and political changes that began with the 1989 revolutions and
intensified with the decline of the liberal world order. Along with both countries’ struggles to
adjust within an economic and social peripheral space in the European Union, they have also
faced dramatic social changes around religiosity, gender norms, urbanization, and the
understanding of history, nationhood, and democracy. By utilizing a constructivist framework, I
am better equipped to identify and analyze how these shifts paint the development of antiLGBT+ politics in Poland and Hungary, and offer a deeper understanding of Polish and
Hungarian sentiments occasionally neglected in Western European and North American
scholarship. The influence of economic instability, colonial history, and political liminality are
critical to understanding the rise and popularity of Fidesz and PiS, as well as how their own
homophobic and transphobic perspectives emerge. Effective answers to the crisis require
acknowledging these contexts.
Hearing such voices is quite different than endorsing them, and the continued diplomatic
isolation of Poland and Hungary, self-imposed by their bigotry, enable these governments to
further exacerbate tensions. The last section of this paper will demonstrate that an environment
15

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in
Poland. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
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that permits mass violence against LGBT+ people has developed, and that targeted violence
against the LGBT+ community, on a scale not seen in Europe since the Soviet Union’s collapse,
is a distinct and frightening possibility.
Literature Review
Countless scholars have analyzed the recent politics of Poland and especially Hungary as
cases of the larger nationalist and populist movements that have developed across the European
Union. Far fewer (such as Verpoest, who also analyzed similar anti-LGBT+ policies in Russia16)
have explored the relationship between Fidesz, PiS, and their LGBT+ communities, despite years
of targeted opposition. Scholars have instead focused on these governments’ broader hostilities
to neoliberalism and “pan-European” elites,17 or on the response of both governments to the
2014-2015 migrant crisis, where similar demagoguery was platformed (and, unlike with
contemporary anti-LGBT+ politics, endorsed) by the broader Western media as part of a panContinental debate.18 Even when contemporary scholars apply theoretical frameworks to PiS and
Fidesz’ rule, as Körösényi, Illés, and Gyulai have done, the particularities of anti-LGBT+ politics
are left unexplored.19
Considerably more is written about this topic, as one would expect, in queer and gender
studies. Both PiS and Fidesz, as socially conservative parties, have fought back fiercely against
women’s rights and feminist organizations under the same “gender ideology” umbrella often
used to justify anti-LGBT+ sentiment. As such, and in a fashion one encounters less in Western
Europe, feminist and LGBT+ advocacy groups have largely unified, and earn similar scholarly
coverage.20 By far, the most prolific of these writers is Agnieszka Graff, who has diligently
written about the community from its first major visibility campaigns to the rising wave of
nationalist opposition.21
National trauma first appeared conceptually within the Israeli psychological
community22, but was quickly adopted by queer and post-colonial scholars for its ability to
examine structural, multigenerational difficulties in their subjects. National trauma is, however,
still ill-defined, requiring me to develop a unique definition that incorporates the perspectives of
several international relations scholars. Kinnvall, for instance, analyzes the role of trauma and

Verpoest, Lien. “The End of Rhetorics: LGBT Policies in Russia and the European Union.” Studia Diplomatica,
vol. 68, no. 4, Egmont Institute, 2017, pp. 3–20
17 Rydliński, Bartosz M, 2018.
18 Nyyssönen, Heino. “Viktor Orbán’s Anti-Brussels Rhetoric in Hungary: Barely Able to Keep Europe Christian?”
National Rhetorics in the Syrian Immigration Crisis: Victims, Frauds, and Floods, edited by Clarke Rountree and
Founi Tilli, Michigan State University Press, 2019, pp. 97–124.
19 Körösényi, András, Illés, Gábor, and Gyulai, Attila. The Orbán Regime. Routledge, 2020.
20 Hall, Bogmillia. “Gendering Resistance to Right-Wing Populism: Black Protest and a New Wave of Feminist
Activism in Poand?” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 63, no. 10, 2019, pp.1497-1515.
21 Graff, 2010.
22 Plotkin-Amrani, Galia, and Brunner, José. “Making Up ‘National Trauma’ in Israel: From Collective Identity to
Collective Vulnerability.” Social Studies of Science, vol. 45, no. 4, 2015, pp.525-545.
16
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“insecure identities” in promulgating anti-immigrant and extremist sentiment in Europe.23 Ó
Gráda analyzed the ability of the state to redirect the collective memory of traumatic events to
contemporary political contexts.24 Schick discussed the state’s role in interpreting and recovering
from national trauma events, and its ability to encourage “post-traumatic violence.”25 Lerner
analyzed the role of poverty and economic insecurity in intensifying national trauma narratives26.
Primary sources for my research come from the immense coverage performed by
journalists, LGBT+ advocacy groups, and human rights NGOs (Human Rights Watch, the Polish
and Hungarian branches of Amnesty International, the Kampania Przeciw Homofobii, the Háttér
Társaság and ILGA-Europe). Poland and Hungary have substantial English-language press and
media coverage, and this is aided especially by declarations, speeches, and statements that both
governments publish in English. International organizations, namely the Council of Europe and
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have also published numerous
investigations of human rights violations in both countries. While their governments have
stymied queer voices on traditional media and academic channels, many individual LGBT+
Hungarians and Poles have continued to publish photographs, statements, and videos online, or
have corresponded with me personally and have thus provided invaluable insight.
National Trauma, Collective Memory, and the Construction of Political Narratives
“The greatest sources of our suffering are the lies we tell ourselves.”
- Bessel van der Kolk, psychiatrist and researcher, The Body Keeps the Score, 2014.
Conceptually Defining “National Trauma”
National trauma, despite growing interest, remains under-discussed and ill-defined in
international political discourse. As such, this section of the paper establishes a framework for
understanding national trauma before it is applied to contemporary Polish and Hungarian
politics. This necessitates an examination both of constructivism within an international political
context, and “collective trauma” within group psychology.
Constructivist interpretations of international politics are similarly youthful, endorsed by
contemporary scholars such as Said, Sikkink, Finnemore, and Wendt, and mainly emerged in
opposition to the “neorealist” school that dominated Western foreign policy circles in the early
2000s. Constructivism sought to demonstrate the importance of social norms and frameworks (in
a sense, socially constructed perspectives) in analyzing political decision-making. In one of the
school’s seminal pieces, for instance, Alexander Wendt argues that the neorealist interpretation
of international politics, built around interstate anarchy and Darwinism, was itself an
Kinnvall, Catarina. “European Trauma: Governance and the Psychological Moment.” Alternatives: Global, Local,
Political. Vol. 37, no. 3, 2012.
24 Ó Gráda, Cormac. “Famine, Trauma, and Memory.” Bealoideas, vol. 69, 2001, pp.121-143.
25 Schick, Kate. “Acting Out and Working Through: Trauma and (In)Security.” Review of International Studies, vol.
37, no. 4, Oct 2011, pp.1837-1855.
26 Lerner, Adam B. “Theorizing Collective Trauma in International Political Economy.” Review of International
Studies, vol. 21, 2019, pp.549-571.
23
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interpretation built on a specific fashioning of beliefs, experiences, and practices. In acting out
these constructed viewpoints, neorealists create an international legal system that mirrors their
own views; in his words, “Anarchy is what states make of it.”27
“National trauma” is one possible framework by which a nation constructs its identity in
relation to other states, focusing specifically on events that either traumatized a significant
portion of the collective group, or created a “crisis of meaning” that fundamentally altered the
group’s self-perception.28 This construction is inculcated and reproduced both by the general
populace and its decision-makers. In a sense, trauma informs policy, and policy often reinforces
the importance of that trauma to group identity.
It is extremely important to stress that collective trauma (including national) and
individual trauma differ in substantive ways, namely in how trauma is suffered and reinterpreted.
Collective trauma was first explored prominently both by the displaced European Jewish
community in analyzing the collective impact of the Shoah,29 and by anti-colonial scholars, most
prominent among them the psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, in understanding the development of
structural psychological distress. Fanon, in Black Skin, White Masks, attempted to psychoanalyze
the experience of colonized groups, and the inferiority and dependency complexes that are
collectively constructed in response to the intense structural changes brought on by
colonialism.30 Collective trauma did not emerge as a codified concept until the 21st century, as
Israeli psychologists tried to understand the impact of indirect trauma on the Israeli population,
especially its Arab minority, during the Second Intifada.
While their work would later be criticized as an attempt to commercialize a widely
televised conflict,31 the logic of national trauma was largely embraced by the Israeli mental
health community. National trauma explained the onset of post-traumatic insecurities (rather
than the symptomology encountered in, say, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) among a growing
number of Israelis that developed in association with their sense of national belonging. As one
mental health expert, Bleich, explains:
“When we speak of trauma of national origins we also refer... to our feeling of
identification and belonging… As members of the Jewish nation, for example, there is no doubt
that we were raised on myths such as 'remember that which the Amalekites did to you', and that
'in every generation, they rise up against us to annihilate us'. Such myths may mold our psyche
in such a way that we would feel, instinctively and overwhelmingly, that we are threatened by
other nations, that we are victims of constant persecution on their part, and as a result of that
develop, on our part, a suspicious and threatening attitude towards others. From a psychological
perspective, this influence can be attributed to the 'collective unconscious', through which
unconscious forces are expressed, because of our collective association.”
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.”
International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp.391-425.
28 Hirschberger, Gilad. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 2018.
29 Eyerman, Ron. “Social Theory and Trauma.” Acta Sociologica, vol. 56, no. 1, 2013, pp.41-55.
30 Fanon, Frantz. Black Skins, White Masks. Grove Press, 1952. Translated by Richard Philcox.
31 Plotkin-Amrani and Brunner, 2015.
27
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Hirschberger describes the impact of national trauma as follows:
“Collective trauma undermines a fundamental sense of security with long-standing
effects among second and third generations of survivors. At the personal level, these individuals
display significantly higher rates of psychological distress; at the social level second and third
generation survivors display heightened individual and collective fear, feelings of vulnerability,
injured national pride, humiliation, a crisis of identity, and a predisposition to react with
heightened vigilance to new threats, such that the pain of past generations is conflated with
threats facing the current generation… Although trauma is undoubtedly destructive, meaning is
often unexpectedly found in calamity... Trauma may contribute to the creation of a national
narrative, a sense of identity, and cognitive working models that ostensibly function to ensure the
safety and well-being of the group and provide it with values and guidelines for the future.
Collective trauma may, therefore, facilitate the construction of the various elements of meaning
and social identity: purpose, values, efficacy, and collective worth. These effects of trauma on
the construction of collective meaning may, ironically, increase as time elapses from the
traumatic event because the focus of memory shifts from the painful loss of lives to the long-term
lessons groups derive from the trauma.”32
“National trauma,” then, only mirrors the most extensive of psychological traumas
experienced by an individual, those which cause major disruptions to prior personalization and
self-concept, such as in situations of chronic domestic or child abuse.33 One can see its
intersection with minority stress and the multigenerational trauma of inequality, which helps
explain its popularity among postcolonial scholars seeking alternatives to individualistic and
“Western” perspectives of trauma.34 Individual trauma can inform and reinforce this collective
trauma, but, more commonly, individual experiences have a complexity and personification that
contradicts the simple and uncomplicated narratives utilized in “national trauma.” As one might
imagine, this can potentially isolate survivors and their perspectives.
Alternative perspectives to the “chosen trauma,” internally or otherwise, are met with
fierce resistance, due in large part because of the emotional investment and self-perception that
are incorporated with the trauma narrative. An attack on the narrative becomes an attack on their
identity, feeding further into the chosen. On a state level, practitioners are more likely to
suppress these alternatives by whatever means available, to obvious consequences for democratic
institutions. Schulman, calling this suppression “the narcissism of trauma” argues that this desire
to protect the narrative is often as strong as the desire to protect the group, and can create serious
barriers to policy discussion that challenges this “trauma-conceptualization.” She uses the IsraelPalestine peace process as an example, and how the concession of wrongdoing on the part of
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Israeli’s is resisted partly for its incoherence with the nation’s “chosen trauma.”35 Schick argues
similarly, noting that this suppression of discourse makes the escalation of violence a greater
possibility, as alternative and peaceful resolutions are wilfully avoided.36
With these contexts in mind, I define national trauma as the present, constructed
response to past group experiences, which shape collective identity and are incorporated by the
state and civil society as a foundational source of national meaning. Thus incorporated, this
trauma influences the behavior both of the state and its citizenry, where normative interpretations
are reapplied to modern insecurities and policies, creating a worldview and political framework
predominantly focused on the recognition and avoidance of past collective pain. This framework
is, by design, exclusionary both of those not in the national “in-group” who are perceived as
unable to conceive this pain, and any in-group opposition towards the normative interpretation of
the trauma or its effects on the collective identity.
Manifestations and Conditionalities of National Trauma
It is not particularly difficult to identify possible examples of “national trauma” in
contemporary history, such as the discriminatory policies in Israel most often associated with
Revisionist Zionism or the sudden political and cultural emphasis on counterterrorism in the
United States after the September 11th attacks. Nearly every human being, and countless groups
across the species, have experienced some form of trauma, and their self-perception and group
identification have likely been shaped by trauma in some way. Thus, I must specify that my
definition of national trauma distinguishes itself in that trauma becomes the primary vector by
which both group identity and state policy is framed. Trauma is not merely a facet of the
collective, but becomes the basis of the identity itself. In this paper’s context, to be Polish or
Hungarian is to know past suffering, and to be prepared for any actions that can halt future
suffering. From a governmental perspective, every decision in foreign and domestic policy is
viewed from its potentiality to recreate group pain.
A recurring question that emerges from this paper is whether Fidesz and PiS, the two
sample governments, deliberately develop a chosen trauma for their own political ends, or if the
government leaders themselves have internalized the narratives. For both parties, contradictory
evidence exists. If the former, pragmatist perspective is taken, it is worth mentioning what both
parties stand to gain politically. Hirschberger mentioned how group solidarity and national selfidentification can be greatly emotionally strengthened by shared trauma; this especially benefits
populists and nationalists, respectively. Both PiS and Fidesz have been described as such, with
their leaders traditionally labeled “authoritarian.” While I disagree with that particular label, it
cannot be denied that, if they are, the ability to drown out oppositional voices for contradicting
chosen traumas is politically valuable. In fact, evidence exists that both parties have utilized the
chosen trauma to this effect, as I shall demonstrate later. Additionally, I would argue that
35
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national trauma is particularly valuable for states seeking concessions on the international stage.
As international politics are increasingly framed around global justice, human rights, and the
establishment of grievances, a certain language of victimhood needs to be established by any
nation seeking to correct past wrongs. National trauma, obviously, corresponds with such
language.
The “recognition of past pain” can materialize in various forms and require greater statecivil society convergence. Art and media can depict and reinforce trauma narratives;
governments can create memorials and museums that exalt it, or incorporate it into national
symbols. It is also not uncommon to encounter governments investing in historical societies or
academic institutions designed to investigate the national trauma; the work of Yad Vashem is
perhaps the best-known example. While the efforts of such organizations are commendable, they
can unintentionally reinforce trauma narratives, or be usurped by the state with this purpose in
mind.
The “avoidance of past pain,” in turn, quickly transforms into securitization politics.
Group members are encouraged to remain vigilant, and governments are pushed to enact policies
that insulate both the group and the chosen trauma from what are perceived as outside threats.
Securitization changes with the particularities of the trauma narrative: a country that was
invaded, for example, might expand its defense capabilities or tighten border controls, or it
dogmatically oppose any interaction with the former occupier. Since national trauma focuses on
a national group identity, it is hardly surprising that exclusionary securitization generally occurs
on ethnic lines; like in any group, determining a “real” member occupies an inordinate amount of
discourse. In this paper, I will demonstrate how Fidesz and PiS broke away from ethnic politics
by instead incorporating specific norms that are “foundational” to each nation and were/are
vulnerable to past/future attack, which serve a shockingly similar purpose.
There are a few other elements of “national trauma” that escape my definition but are
instrumental in understanding the concept. The first is that “insecure” identities - those more at
risk of targeted violence, such as Arab Israelis in the original study, or those in a “peripheral”
geo-political position - are more likely to experience harsh psychological effects from national
trauma. They are more likely to adopt the national trauma into self-conceptualization; in the case
of the Arab Israelis, destructively.37 As Kinnvall tries to demonstrate, those in liminal spaces are
more likely to close down mediation and support hardline stances to better create a break with
one of the conflicting identities.38 This “peripheral” status helps explain why the Hungarian and
Polish chosen traumas became so popular in the years following Europeanization and why some
queer Poles and Hungarians are especially zealous believers in the narrative. The conflict
between the national and sexual/gender identity produces a small LGBT+ minority in both
countries that actively invests in what might be called “assimilation politics,” and another that
aggressively repudiates any national belonging altogether.
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The second element is mentioned by Lerner in his analysis of collective trauma’s impact
on the international political economy. He argues that poverty, and its consequences across
generations, can catalyze collective trauma. As Lerner explains:
“While scholarship on collective trauma has often considered the psychological and
sociological consequences of forced evacuation, famine and other situations of economic
suffering as forms of collective trauma, it has scarcely considered the way in which the
experience of poverty itself can entail vulnerability to trauma… we must address the way in
which poverty serves as a reservoir of collective trauma and how the continuous vulnerability to
stresses and shocks it entails contributes to identity when narrated.”39
Lerner likewise argues that visible economic disparity, such as that made evident in the
development inequalities in the European Union, can heighten the impact of trauma. I expand
this argument to include economic and financial uncertainty, above the contextualization of
poverty independently. Kinnvall argue that these conditions, which erupted into the West during
the Great Recession, have intensified identity politics throughout Europe.40 Trauma, then, is tied
both to economic and “ontological” insecurity. Not only do these factors increase one’s
vulnerability to trauma, but they empower the trauma narrative's applicability to contemporary
challenges faced by individuals.
The final element is that trauma narratives are malleable. One can easily identify similar
qualities in individual trauma, as well; studies have demonstrated that one’s memory of a
traumatic event can be easily replaced by one more conducive to the reformed self-concept.41 Ó
Gráda wrote prominently about this, from the national perspective, in analyzing the revisionism
surrounding the Irish government’s vision of the Great Famine during the 150th Commemoration
ceremonies.42 National trauma, like nationalism in general, lends itself to myth-building, and
continued reinforcement of the chosen trauma by the state and society can submerge “original”
memories where little knowledge or space for alternatives is present. This malleability has been
instrumental in both government’sframing Polish and Hungarian national trauma in opposition to
queer identities, as both countries have historically been lenient in suppressing queer identities
compared to their then-overlords.
The Rise of Fidesz, Law and Justice, and the “Chosen Trauma”
“Today’s enemies of freedom are cut from a different cloth than the royal and imperial rulers of
old, or those who ran the Soviet system; they use a different set of tools to force us into
submission… Today the international media’s artillery bombardments, denunciations, threats
and blackmail are enough. In Europe today it is forbidden to speak the truth, but a muzzle is a
muzzle - even if it is made from silk.”
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Viktor Orbán, Speech Commemorating the 15th of March (the Anniversary of the 1848
Hungarian Revolution), 2016.
“Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła, / Kiedy my żyjemy. / Co nam obca przemoc wzięła, / Szablą
odbierzemy. (Poland has not yet perished, / So long as we still live. / What the foreigners have
taken from us, / We shall with saber retrieve.)”.
- The first verse of “Mazurek Dąbrowskiego,” the Polish National Anthem, modern lyrics
and translation
If national trauma is a constructed narrative force, then it is critical to identify where and
how this construction has emerged, and whose narrative, if anyone’s, has become the “chosen
trauma” defining Polish and Hungarian belonging. Enter Fidesz and PiS: since their resumption
of power in 2010 and 2015, respectively, both parties have increasingly incorporated national
trauma into their political regimes, which have historically defied easy classification. This
section will discuss the development of both, in detail, as well as the historical and contemporary
factors that enabled these governments to take power and to so effectively bring national trauma
from the ultranationalist muck of its birth into the political mainstream.
Fidesz and PiS have unique regimes in the European Union. Orbán’s government, for
instance, is one of the most personalistic in the Union’s history, and his antagonists quickly point
to it as evidence of authoritarian or dictatorial rule. Körösényi, Gábor, and Gyulai, perhaps the
most prolific Hungarian political scientists to study Fidesz in depth, use Werberian models to
demonstrate Orbán’s reliance on charismatic forms of power to effectively govern as an elected
strongman. To them, he views all elections, from national referendums to local polls, as a
plebiscite of his rule. When popular support turns against him he immediately alters course. This
has been observed several times, such as during his 2014 implementation of an Internet tax or the
forced closure of shops on Sundays in 2018, which were met with widespread disapproval. When
Orbán wins elections, however, he views them as proof of a special, potentially divine mandate
to rule Hungary as he deems necessary.43 The language of trauma and security is paramount to
this governance: Hungary is under threat from a revolving door of national enemies, and Orbán,
who has mythologized himself into a tradition of martyred national leaders, is portrayed as the
hero Hungary needs to stand against them.44 So far, Orbán has provided little evidence that the
dangers Hungary faces have waned. His self-professed “illiberal democracy” might be
considered Bonapartist in substance.
PiS has, so far, not created a government anywhere close to Orbán’s personalism, but its
reliance on nationalism and populist rhetoric have closely aligned the two, and they frequently
celebrate each other’s political victories. The party emerged from Poland’s political quagmire
following the collapse of the trade-union-turned-political-party Solidarność (Solidarity), of
which PiS claims to be a direct successor, hoping to reignite the national awakening they believe
43
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occurred with the Solidarity Uprising in 1980. While the party attempts to maintain
Solidarność’s more social democratic policies and thus appealing to disillusioned manufacturing
workers through an expanded welfare state and stronger unionization, its support is strongest in
rural areas. Its fierce nationalism, agrarian opposition to “cosmopolitanism” and allegiance to the
Catholic Church and its doctrines have given it immense popularity from the deeply conservative
and religious farming bloc.
The Collapse of State Socialism
Given their emergence during “state socialism,” an explanation of that system is
warranted. Claims of classlessness aside, two major socio-economic groups emerged in Soviet
puppet states. The first was the proletariat of workers and farmers, the majoritarian bedrock of
both countries, and the second the nomenklatura, a new elite that emerged with the rise of
universities and large state bureaucracy. The nomenklatura eventually developed into a
privileged class, enjoying wide political influence and economic luxuries even as the state
socialist economy collapsed around them and inequality began to widen into the 1980s.45 During
this late era, two distinct branches of resistance emerged against state socialism: democratic
socialist trade unions, such as Solidarność, which rallied around working class figures like Lech
Wałęsa, and dissidents from nomenklatura backgrounds. The latter collection of dissident
intellectuals, led by young idealists like Adam Michnik, was particularly inundated with Western
liberalism, then entering its renaissance period, and had contacts with the West. Both groups
congregated during the civil unrest in 1980.
The eventual founders of PiS, Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, came to revolutionary
prominence as lawyers, defending the rights of Solidarność union members that were imprisoned
en masse as the Polish People’s Republic declared martial law to crack down on the protests.
Their proximity to the working class brought them into Wałęsa’s circle, where both pushed for
conservative politics in the tradition of Pope John Paul II. Poland’s first Pope, famous for his
anti-Communist advocacy, was a major inspiration to the Kaczyński’s in stark contrast to their
nomenklatura peers. Like many other intellectuals, the brothers escaped the military crackdown,
which arrested many of Solidarity’s left-wing, proletariat leaders. This discrepancy pushed the
Polish resistance firmly away from socialism and closer to the Western political sphere.
Throughout the 1980s, the dissidents made contact with interested Western parties from hiding.
One of these contacts is worth specific mention: George Soros, a Jewish native of
Hungary and billionaire financier who evaded the Nazis and Soviets both before fleeing to
America as a child. Soros was adamant in democratizing the regimes of Central Europe, and his
Open Societies rang through dissident circles to find capable leaders. In Hungary, he stumbled
across the student group known as the Alliance of Young Democrats (acronym FiDeSz), which
in 1988 was organizing a radical youth-based democratic opposition in contest with more
popular, moderate factions. Inspired, Soros located a particularly promising firebrand, the 25year-old Viktor Orbán, and secured for him an education at Oxford the student would terminate
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as revolutionary sentiment heated in 1989. In a desperate attempt to court moderate activists,
Hungary’s government planned to re-bury and re-honor the leaders of the 1956 Revolution,
which had briefly escaped the Soviet sphere through a socialist democracy organized by the
reformer Imre Nagy. Willfully ignoring government orders to leave Nagy’s name unmentioned,
Orbán, in speaking at the burial, encouraged Hungarians to capture the essence of this former
resistance until complete Soviet withdrawal. This Antonian performance secured a permanent
position for Orbán in the radical opposition (see Appendix, Figure C).
Even then, Orbán and the Kaczyński brothers framed their ideologies along lines of
trauma, depicting the Soviet military presence as the latest in a long line of foreign occupations
stretching back centuries. Swedes, Austrians, Germans, Russians, Germans again, Ottoman
Turks, Russians again, and so forth had, at some point, occupied these countries throughout most
of modern European history. Brief windows of independence in the interwar period - Poland’s
semi-militarian republic and Hungary’s authoritarian Horthy regime - were stamped apart by the
Nazis and Soviets both in a colorful story of betrayal and slaughter. That story was willfully
suppressed; the Soviets had deliberately destroyed cultural and national landmarks it could not
accommodate into its imperial vision. In this environment, national histories were celebrated
domestically, passed down by family members as well as a thousand Western and local channels
piercing the Iron Curtain of information. In Poland’s case especially, the Catholic Church
maintained a cultural influence unique in the Soviet sphere, both through a concerted campaign
of resistance and hesitant collaboration with the regime.
Brevity forces me to forsake detailing this long history, documented in countless other
locations. Rather, I shall only include elements of the historical narratives that would prove
fundamental to the development of PiS and Fidesz’ “national traumas.” In Poland, this focuses
heavily on the Second World War, where the country was an infamous victim of the Nazis’
genocidal plans. Beyond using the country as the major site of the Holocaust, Poland’s
occupation regime was dedicated to transforming ethnic Poles into a slave caste, and enacted
harrowing policies towards that end at the expense of millions of lives and untold hardship. The
Soviets were hardly better: of particular note, their migration policies led millions of ethnic Jews
and Germans to vacate the country (forcefully or otherwise), leaving behind a newly
homogenous Poland stripped of much of its non-Catholic culture and history.
Hungary’s history is more complicated. Orbán romanticizes Hungary’s interwar leader,
the right-wing Miklós Horthy, as a savior of the newly-independent state from a Bolshevik
Revolution in 1919. Holding the reins of power from the collapse of Austria-Hungary to 1944,
Horthy maintained a repressive, dictatorial rule noted for its rabid anti-Semitism. The Regent, as
he was called, maintained legitimacy among nationalists and monarchists through his constant
refusal to recognize the 1919 Treaty of Trianon, which broke apart the Austro-Hungarian Empire
and granted large swathes of Hungarian land populated with ethnic minorities to corresponding
ethnic nations. With 2/3rds of its pre-war territory and a 1/3rd of its ethnic Hungarian population
separated into other nation-states, many right-wing Hungarians saw Trianon as a deliberate
attack against “Greater Hungary” by Western elites and their liberal, cosmopolitan allies. Horthy
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used such tensions to maintain popular support. Unsurprisingly, such irredentist politics led
Horthy to collaborate with the similarly scorned Nazi regime, implementing Nuremburg-esque
laws and joining Operation Barbarossa. A combination of Horthy’s reluctance to send Jews to
their deaths in Poland and secret parlays as the Soviets reached Hungary’s borders prompted the
Germans to overthrow him and invade their ally. They helped establish a vicious collaborator
regime, the Arrow Cross, and oversaw a bloodletting of Hungarian Jews before being driven
from Hungary by the Red Army. In retaliation for their collaboration, the Soviets exiled
Hungary’s large ethnic German minority. In conjunction with the Holocaust, Hungary’s
heterogeneity, like Poland’s, was permanently displaced.
The brutality of the state socialist regimes is well documented, even during the
“moderate” period, and the trauma narratives incorporate this hardship with narratives of
resistance and martyrdom. One example in Poland comes from the 1944 Warsaw Uprising,
which saw the Reich beat back a nationalist partisan revolt as the Soviets tactically disengaged to
weaken future anti-imperial resistance. In Hungary, the liberal, anti-Austrian Revolution of 1848,
led by Lajos Kossuth, and the Revolution of 1956 are commemorated in national holidays. These
revolutions also demonstrated a history of popular, “Western” dissension that seeped into the
Orientalism that framed Polish and Hungarian liminality. The dissidents, through this past, saw
themselves at the border of democratic, Catholic Christendom, and the Western civilization that
cradled both. Thus can one identify a nascent trauma narrative in Orbán’s speech at Nagy’s
grave:
“Since the Russian occupation… The Hungarian nation has once had an
opportunity, and once only had the courage and strength to try to achieve its goals,
national independence and political freedom, set as early as 1848. We won’t let go of ’48
today, so we won’t let go of ’56 either. We have learned from their destiny that
democracy and communism are incompatible. The bankruptcy that is falling on our
shoulders today is a direct consequence of the fact that our revolution has been stifled in
blood and we are being forced back into the Asian impasse from which we are now trying
to find a way out again…
[We, the youth] are puzzled that those who have recently insulted the revolution
and [Nagy] in unison today unexpectedly realize that they are the successors of [his]
reform policy. Nor do we understand that the party and state leaders who ordered us to
be educated from the textbooks that falsified the revolution are [today touching these
coffins], as a sort of lucky talisman.
Today… we have a chance to achieve peacefully all that the ´56 revolutionaries
gained in the bloody battles, if only for a few days, for the nation. If we believe in our
own strength, we will be able to put an end to the communist dictatorship, if we are
determined enough, we can squeeze the ruling party to submit to free elections. If we do
not lose sight of ´56's ideas, we can choose a government that will begin negotiations to
begin withdrawing Russian troops immediately. If we have the courage in us to want all
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this, then, but only then, can we achieve our revolution. No one can believe that the party
state will change on its own.”46
When the Iron Curtain crashed and both resistance movements triumphed in their
nation’s first elections, however, they quickly encountered serious difficulties. In Poland, the
working class Solidarność members turned to their liberal, intellectual compatriots in an
awkward alliance built around Wałęsa.47 In Hungary, Fidesz found itself rapidly sidelined by the
moderate factions who quickly developed rapport with the former Communists, now social
democrats, that rallied old nomenklatura voters.48 Neither was equipped to handle the deficitridden, shortage-infested economies they had inherited; they instead turned to the West for aid.
“Shock Therapy” and Westernization
The West’s response came from its intellectuals. The most prominent by far was Harvard
Professor of Economics Jeffrey Sachs, whose team was funded by Soros to begin the
privatization of Poland’s large, uncompetitive manufacturing and service sectors. Sachs, inspired
by the success of neoclassical strategies in the West, encouraged Poland to implement mass
marketization as quickly as possible, and he had the conditional promises of Western debt
amnesty and IMF aid to support him.49 This strategy, officially named the Balcerowicz Plan for
its lead Minister, came to be known as “shock therapy.”50 With equally little recourse, Hungary
followed suit.
Shock Therapy, indeed, removed much of state socialism’s residue. After several years of
sweeping reforms, central banks were able to stabilize both countries’ deficits and currencies
while securing a position (albeit, a poor one) in the larger European economy. The social costs,
however, proved devastating. For its faults, the People’s Republics had built expansive welfare
states that not only included extensive health, family, and retirement care, but incorporated a
dearth of state-sponsored civil society institutions: community centers, athletic clubs, volunteer
groups, and so forth. Poland’s social spending dropped from 35% to 3% of GDP in two years,
demolishing this network. Rural citizens, the elderly, and mothers were particularly affected; in
the absence of other community services, rural Poles and Hungarians flocked to the Church.51
The nomenklatura largely survived the collapse of the state that supported them by transferring
their technical skills to the private sector. As shall be demonstrated, this class, despite its
association with state socialism, became the primary beneficiaries of liberalization.
Shock therapy inhibited civil society in other ways. The nouveau bourgeoisie protected
the urban artistic, educational, and community institutions, which quickly fell in with the secular
Western movements that had long been denied to them. Local NGOs, widely held by Western
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intellectuals as foundational for the rapid development of stable democracy, struggled to survive,
as the government grants they expected never effectively materialized.52 With little recourse,
they too turned to the elites, or to larger Western NGOs and their political objectives. This
renaissance in one pole, and mass return to Catholicism in the other, created a deep cultural
divide in both countries, heightened by a renewed historiography that often neglected the
contributions of ethnic and religious minorities no longer present. The idea that “to be Polish is
to be Catholic,” absurd a century before, rapidly became mainstream.53
Economically, early privatization was a devastating affair, with dramatic shortfalls in
production, employment, and living standards. Polish and Hungarian firms had grown
unaccustomed to competition, and many of them struggled to stay afloat on globalized markets.
Foreign firms quickly took advantage of these circumstances, as well as the sudden disbanding
of state-sponsored unions, buying privatized factories for cheap and pushing wages and labor
standards as low as they could.54 The working class chafed as poverty rates doubled, and high
inflation hounded both economies throughout the 1990s. The intellectual dissident inheritors
(now largely referred to as the liberals) realized this was a politically untenuous situation, but
had few alternatives. The international system had moved firmly away from social service
expansion, and neither country could afford isolation from global economic aid.55 Instead, both
countries zealously pursued Europeanization and the development it could bring; both joined the
European Union in 2004 and the Schengen Area in 2007. Europeanization did, in fact, bring
much-needed development funding, but did little to resolve the gross inequalities between
Poland, Hungary, and their Western neighbors. It also exacerbated a massive emigration crisis,
and millions of young Poles and Magyars fled to the (relative) prosperity of Western Europe’s
lower classes. By joining the global and European economy, the Polish and Hungarian elites
seemingly placed their countries permanently below the development of their neighbors. To this
day, the average Polish and Hungarian wage is roughly a third of Germany and Austria’s. The
monolithic liberalism of Polish and Hungarian politics meant that these economic travesties, and
others like the 2008 Financial Crisis, were met with further privatization and free market
policies, exacerbating the same tensions.
These conditions are vital in understanding the popularity of national trauma in both
countries. The collapse of safety nets and family care made poverty a real threat to millions for
the first time; competitive wages could not compete with inflation rates and market trends, and
mass emigration threatened families more dependent than ever on their youth. When wealth did
enter the country, as it began to in the 2000s, it disproportionately fell into the hands of the
nomenklatura and liberal elites: before the transfer systems built by PiS and Fidesz, Poland and
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Hungary had some of the highest measures of wealth and income inequality in the European
Union. These stressors created an atmosphere of permanent crisis that are reflected in both
nations’ politics; they also enabled a deepening ontological crisis as Europeanization continued.
Despite the claims of being a “Western bulwark,” Poland and Hungary both experienced an
immense culture shock as Western media, norms, secularism and businesses flooded the country
in escalating quantities. Half a century of Western cultural development, once a trickle from the
nomenklatura, surged into Poland and Hungary in conjunction with widespread internet usage
and the sudden opening of many spaces once closed by the Soviets. For some Poles and
Hungarians, it proved too much to accommodate.
Some of those disillusioned, however, utilized these new spaces to pursue nationalist
ends once banned under the Soviet puppet regimes, quickly joined by right-wing academics
returning from a long, Communist-enforced exile. Most of these eventually organized into the
skinhead and hooligan subcultures found throughout Europe. They exported their rage into their
subculture’s historic pastimes of forming militant groups, attending large nationalist and
religious rallies, and organizing attacks on Jews, Romani, and LGBT+ people. A few entrenched
themselves in a bizarre nationalist academia that would become the incubator of Fidesz and PiS’
trauma narratives. In Poland especially, these pseudo-intellectuals merged with Catholic
fundamentalist groups and borrowed from them some of the more absurd homophobic claims
that occupy both government’s visions of the LGBT+ community. These include conspiracies of
a “gay agenda” seeking the expansion of global pedophilia, deliberately constructed by globalist
liberals and the “International Jewry” led by Soros.56 In the 1990s and early 2000s, these groups,
rarely banned and largely tolerated even by progressive governments, organized around a
number of radical parties. In Hungary, the main beneficiary was Jobbik (an acronym of
Movement for a Better Hungary), which came third in the 2010 election. In Poland, they
organized across a dozen parties, but the largest were Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej
(Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland), Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families),
and, later, Solidarna Polska (United Poland).
The mainstream parties, however, struggled throughout the 1990s. Shock therapy led to
the collapse of the moderate dissident Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) party and their
government. The social democrats and liberals, under the Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP) and
Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a Magyar Liberális Párt (MSZDP), respectively, won the next
elections with promises to expand social securities. These never materialized, and thus the
previously isolated Fidesz rose to power in 1998 as a center-right, self-proclaimed “Christian
Democratic” party. Orbán, though Prime Minister, was not the leader he would become;
constrained by the other, more left-wing founders, and still in full support of liberal politics,
Orbán cut an awkward figure in Hungarian politics and lost power within four years.57 He held
his fellow founders responsible for creating the discord that crushed Fidesz’ chances, forcing
them from the party and bending what remained increasingly around himself. It was somewhere
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between his defeat and the 2006 election that Orbán and his compatriots began to seriously
explore nationalist circles.
Poland’s politics proved even more dysfunctional. The class tensions within the party
were exacerbated by Wałęsa’s belligerent presidency, which alienated many allies, including the
Kaczyńskis. Solidarność broke into a dozen splinter parties, each as incapable of addressing
Poland’s economic and social crises as the other, and taking turns at power like a carousel.58 To
provide an example, after dropping Solidarity, the Kaczyńskis founded the self-described “antiCommunist” Centre Agreement, which won 44 seats in the Sejm in the 1991 election and lost 44
seats in the 1993 election. The brothers then joined the center-right agrarian Solidarity Electoral
Action, returning to the original trade union, which found immediate success against the
incumbents and won 201 seats in 1997. In 2001, the party lost all of them, though at that point
the brothers had already jumped ship and founded PiS, which held the government for a single
election cycle from 2005-2007. It was not until 2019 that a single incumbent government ever
won reelection in Poland.59
National Trauma Becomes Mainstream
Under Law and Justice, the Kaczyńskis’ primary platform focused on an expansion of
lustration: the process of weeding out former People’s Republic and KGB collaborators from
public office.60 The rise of the aforementioned ultra-Catholic parties allowed PiS to coalesce
with those closer to its social values, rather than the centrist Platforma Obywatelska (Civic
Platform).61 The rise of this far-right to power coincided with the most violent backlash against
the LGBT+ community to date. The government made its opinion on this issue known: some
politicians banned Equality Marches, occasionally using the police to enforce their wishes. As
one PiS member of the Sejm put it, “if deviants start to demonstrate, they should be bashed with
a baton.”62 Paramilitary violence became a stark reality for many queers, and garnered the
attention of an EU itself grappling with LGBT+ rights. After PiS and Fidesz fell, a series of
centrist and left-wing governments enshrined important protections for LGBT+ people, mainly in
employment and legal gender change, matching EU and NGO pressure after the passage of the
Treaty of Lisbon. Though popular support was firmly against some equality measures, such as
same-sex marriage and adoption, progress was marching forward.
In 2006, the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition held firm, but had to fiercely resist an opposition
now dominated by Orbán. Within a matter of years, he had completely remodeled his image:
bold, energetic, erudite with a touch of humor and commonality. An even more dramatic change
came in his political messaging. The 2006 election saw the debut of Orbán’s trauma narrative,
wrapped around the theme of betrayal. Hungary’s revolution, he argued, had been backstabbed.
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The nomenklatura and their liberal stooges, who he claimed had been deliberately falsifying
reports of economic growth and social security expansion, had betrayed the common Hungarian
by stealing their wealth and denouncing their culture. They had been aided by the Western elites,
or, in Orbán’s language, the “Brussels Bureaucrats,” more interested in creating a cheap labor
camp than a proud Hungarian nation. Appeals to history were ubiquitous throughout, as Orbán
pointed to 1956, the Treaty of Trianon, and other examples of Western indifference to Hungarian
suffering, while painting his opposition as traitors of the same class that signed Trianon or
opened Buda’s gates to the Turks. His solution was lustration on an even greater scale; a
renewed revolution that would permanently cripple the nomenklatura’s power.63
The tactic nearly worked, and Fidesz only lost by a hundred thousand votes. To
moderates, however, many of Orbán’s claims appeared pure conjecture, and too baseless to
actually represent his opposition. Several weeks after the election, however, a leaked recording
of a speech by Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány to inner party members not only inflamed
Hungary in sweeping protests, but completely vindicated Orbán’s accusations. In it, Gyurcsány,
with very strong language, told his cabinet ministers that Orbán’s calculations had been correct
for months. The government had been deliberately falsifying budget reports to stay in power,
power which, in his words, Gyurcsány “fucking loves” in such a “country of whores.” 64
The outrage surrounding this recording was fuelled by a bungled response to the 2008
Financial Crisis, and Fidesz won the 2010 elections in an absolute landslide. The party took
enough seats to achieve a constitutional supermajority, and Orbán pressed his advantage, telling
his broad support base that the revolution had arrived and that a new constitution, completely
separated from the 1949 People’s Republic constitution then utilized, would serve as its catalyst.
The Foundational Law enshrined Orbán’s “illiberal democratic” rule by ensuring a
parliamentary supermajority to whichever party won the popular vote. This was further built in
Fidesz’ favor by expanding the franchise to every ethnic Hungarian in Hungary’s pre-Trianon
borders, where Orbán enjoyed wide support as a defender of Hungarian minorities that were
frequently targeted by nationalist Romanian and Slovakian politicians. Every Supreme Court
decision prior to 2011 was annulled, and any law passed by a two-thirds majority in the National
Assembly (in effect, anything passed by Fidesz) cannot be reviewed by the Court. Political
advertising can only be done through state media; anti-Communism and Christianity are
enshrined within the document, as is a segment dedicated to acknowledging “crimes of the
previous regime.” Article L of the Foundation states that: “Hungary shall protect the institution
of marriage as the union of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision, and the family
as the basis of the survival of the nation.” It was used to constitutionally deny homosexual
couples marriage or adoption rights.65 The specifics of Orbán’s “revolution” are explored
elsewhere, but one can summarize that the Fundamental Law allowed him to bend Hungarian
politics and society increasingly to his will, bolstered throughout by arguments of trauma.
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The West’s first real alert to these trauma arguments emerged during the 2015 Migrant
Crisis, itself only a year after Fidesz secured the 2014 election at a considerably smaller margin
of the vote. Overnight, Orbán’s name quickly became associated with some of the most
virulently anti-immigrant policies in the EU, including the construction of a fence along the
entire Serbian border. Immigration rapidly became the dominant issue in Hungarian politics, and
Orbán’s trauma narrative quickly adapted to it. His most famous claims concerned Hungary’s
“destiny” as a defender against Islam. He argued that the migrants represented a deliberate effort
by the “Brussels Bureaucrats” and their ally, George Soros, to destroy the Hungarian nation, and
that any relaxation of immigration policy could very well spark an “invasion.”66 Körösényi, Illés,
and Gyulai point to Orbán’s immigration policy as the pinnacle of his ability to force Hungarian
politics into his “crisis narratives,” further reinforcing his charismatic legitimacy as a heroic
savior against these largely invented threats.67 It worked stunningly well. Fidesz’ popularity
among voters returned, bolstered by the many far-right groups that abandoned Jobbik as the
Hungarian government began to appeal to them directly, strangling one of its last rivals.
Many Western governments, journalists, and NGOs were horrified by this demagoguery,
only to watch as another member delved into similar politics. After it lost power in 2007, PiS had
been dealt a further blow in 2010 when Lech Kaczyński, then President of Poland, perished with
his wife and 94 others in a plane crash in Smolensk. His brother moved the party forward, still
relentlessly pushing for colder relations between Russia and the European Union, deeper
lustration policies, fierce Euroscepticism and an expanded welfare state. This populism was
initially submerged by bringing moderate PiS members into the spotlight. While these moderates
helped the party secure a majority government in the 2015 election (a first for Poland), they were
nearly all replaced within the administration’s first two years. PiS, too, took advantage of its
majority by restricting the powers of constitutional courts and tightening the party’s control of
state media, though PiS never reached the popularity needed to redraft the constitution. Against
the opposition this garnered, Kaczyński appealed to Polish trauma:
“The opposition will act without any limits… They are trying to convince people that in
the middle of a hot summer it is a freezing, harsh winter… These are not people who are right in
the head… Right here are the people who think, and who know perfectly well that in Poland
there is no threat to democracy….
This is mostly about fear. About ensuring that the gigantic wave of abuse that took place
over the past eight years does not come to light….Those who, during the so-called
transformation, abandoned communism, but only gave up power for property—they want to
continue to get fat. And those who were co-opted into that group, too… That’s what this is about.
Not to give anything to the ordinary Pole, but to make it possible to continue to rob Poland…
The Constitutional Tribunal was supposed to be the last defense for that network. For everything
that was bad and disgraceful over the past 26 years.”
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It is harder to place where PiS began exporting its “chosen trauma,” though it likely
emerged from the far-right circles the party had previously aligned itself to. What is undeniable,
however, is that national trauma played an important role in the 2015 election, where PiS
provided a political narrative coincidentally similar to Orbán’s. From a television address
Kaczyński gave:
“In Poland there is a fatal tradition of national treason. And this is precisely tied to that.
It is sort of in the genes of some people, the worst sort of Poles. And that worst sort is precisely
now extraordinarily active, because they feel threatened. Just consider WWII, then communism,
then the [liberalization]: precisely this type of person dominated, was given every chance. They
are afraid today that the times are changing, that the time is coming when things will be as they
are supposed to be, and another type of person—that means, those having loftier, patriotic
motivations—will be placed in the lead, and that will apply to every aspect of social life,
including economic life.”
Once again, one sees an appeal to answering unanswered crimes, to righting historical
injustice, and claims that the Revolution of 1989 was unfinished. However, these rhetorics were
supplemented by the largest welfare expansion in the Republic’s history, focusing specifically on
pension reform and a new, natalist subsidy. Both proved especially popular in rural and more
elderly communities. As such, when PiS went on to claim that it had renewed the mandate of
Solidarność, far more were willing to believe them.68 In a country exhausted by its own political
chaos, PiS thrived; despite fielding far more radical candidates in 2019, it secured an even
greater proportion of the vote (see Appendix, Figure D).
A key source of PiS’ support is, and always has been, the Catholic Church, which in
Poland is dominated by its eldest and most politically extreme clergy. As mentioned, the Church
secured a fundamental role in rural communities, but even this has failed to stem a growing
secular trend in urban spaces and falling Mass attendance rates among young Poles. This, and a
series of crippling scandals surrounding collaboration with the KGB and widespread child sexual
abuse have placed the Church at a precipice.69 Explicitly desperate to avoid a fate similar to the
clergy of Ireland, the Church has increasingly endorsed PiS politicians, who, in turn, alter their
social policies and legislation within days of the Bishops’ Conference recommendations. Much
of PiS’ particularly virulent rhetoric about the LGBT+ community is taken, verbatim, from the
words of Archbishops and Cardinals.70 PiS’ party platform provides insight into the importance
of Catholicism in government policy:
“In our history the Church played, and continues to play, a unique role, different than in
the history of other nations. It not only created our nation and our civilization, but also protected
it—when the Church, already in the Middle Ages, rejected efforts by foreigners to rule, when
later the first authors calling for a renewal of the Republic came from the clergy. In the
extremely unpropitious circumstances of the time when Poland was partitioned, just as in the
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Polish People’s Republic, the Church was the foundation of Polishness, and fulfilled its role as a
substitute for the non-existent sovereign state… To this day, the Church sustains and proclaims
moral teachings that are universally recognized in Poland. There is no competition in the wider
society... For these reasons, the unique status of the Catholic Church in our national and state
life is extraordinarily important. We must maintain it, and we believe that attempts to destroy the
Church, and unfair attacks on the Church, are threats to our social life.
[The Polish-Catholic relationship] is clearly evident with regards to the family. Polish
tradition always treated the family as particularly valuable, and in the period when we lacked
independence, the family was very often the foundation of national identity… The spread of the
ideology of gender is threatening for families and parents in Poland. Its spread has an artificial
character, conditioned above all by a stream of financial resources, mostly from abroad.
Nonetheless, its activity grows, particularly among the youth, and it leads to a spread of
conditions that are not conducive to forming families and having children. Setting up barriers
against the spread of gender ideology is important.”
As the Migrant Crisis dwindled from public memory, both governments grew
increasingly vocal about the need to preserve families. This was both to address the mass
emigration both countries had experienced over decades of unequal development and to protect
them from “gender/LGBT+ ideology.” Fidesz and PiS began to informally restrict adoptions by
individual queers, as well as the legal and medical means by which one can transition. It avoided
Union attention until 2019, when nearly a hundred Polish localities, in protest to the Mayor of
Warsaw’s open support for expanding LGBT+ rights, declared themselves “LGBT IdeologyFree Zones.” Both parties quickly made LGBT+ rights dominant issues in their campaigns
(Poland’s 2020 Presidential election and Hungary’s 2022 Parliamentary elections). Members of
the press called this rapid escalation “the Rainbow Curtain” or the “War on Gender.”71 Trauma,
and the narratives fashioned from it by both governments, not only fuelled both parties’ rise to
power; this paper demonstrates how it trickled through the entire crisis, enabling its
transformation into one of the largest and most organized attacks on LGBT+ rights in European
history.
The LGBT+ Community in Poland and Hungary: The Impacts of Social Tension and
National Trauma on the Inflicted Group
“Yes, I observed the 2004 Queer Parade from the inside, I chatted with the queers. I still
maintain that there was no problem with that parade. Now, in 2008, go ahead and bombard
them and eradicate their organizers. In 2004, and earlier I think, events were absolutely
acceptable. Politics got hold of it, and the whole thing degenerated into an advertisement for
wild-liberal values… it is no accident that fewer and fewer normal homos support the parade.”
- Tamás “Tomcat” Polgár, software engineer and far-right Internet activist, Budapest,
2008.
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“Most of us are scared, but furious; being proud of ourselves is no crime, one woman says.
Others, though, are more ambivalent. After listening for a while, Milán, a young, conservatively
dressed man, nervously stands up and announces that, although he has long taken part, he has
always felt the [Budapest Equality March] was ‘too provocative,’ and that the ‘exhibitionist’
behavior of some of its participants incited right-wing anger. People like drag queens, he insists,
just make things worse for LGBT people ‘trying to live normal lives.’”
- Hadley Renkin, Professor at the Central European University, describing the environment
of the Budapest Equality March after multiple Marchers were injured by nationalist
counterprotestors, 2007.
Much of the trauma narrative Fidesz and PiS has constructed around the LGBT+
community is conjecture: stereotypes, strawmen, and fierce misrepresentation of the needs and
desires of the actual hundreds of thousands who suffer from their actions. As such, the
community itself is not critical to understanding national trauma in Poland and Hungary.
However, recognizing their own growing voicelessness in local and Western media, I feel
obligated to provide information relating to the community’s development during liberalization
and the intense social divides across said community. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate how the
LGBT+ communities in both countries have organized and fractured, and how this has
interrupted larger resistance to government policies. As shall become evident, one finds the
community, and the movement that endorses it, a victim of inopportune timing instead of
unaccommodating radicalism.
The Soviet Union was among the most violently homophobic regimes in history. Sodomy
was an offense that saw (mainly male) perpetrators immediately sent to the Gulag, and, to
expand its vital foundation of forced labor, the KGB organized raids throughout the Warsaw Pact
designed to lure homosexuals.72 In this environment, an organized political movement was nigh
impossible; it also enshrined different interpretations of queer identities than those that
developed in the West. For example, legal and social distinctions for “passive” and “active”
homosexuals were widely recognized. The meaning of “transsexual” moved away from the
discourse around gender dysphoria because of the USSR’s policy of awkwardly changing the
legal gender of “irrecoverable homosexuals” to create heteronormative couplings. Hungary and
Poland were the most tolerant countries in the Pact, with Poland maintaining its interwar
legalization of sodomy and Hungary decriminalizing in the 1960s. Both, however, remained
victims to the KGB, and the culture that developed around it.
The LGBT+ community only became a political movement in the 1990s, when it had the
space to do so. In collaboration with major Western NGOs, nascent local activist groups began
hosting major visibility campaigns into the 2000s. These not only include the Equality Marches,
which began in Budapest in 1997, but campaigns such as “Niech nas zobaczą” (“Let Them See
Us”), which displayed billboards depicting same-sex couples throughout Poland in 2003. These
campaigns succeeded in bringing LGBT+ rights to mainstream discussion, but also courted
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intense backlash by conservatives and nationalists alike, who quickly began to organize attacks
on Equality Marches and advocates.73 This, in turn, terrified older LGBT+ members more than
willing to keep their identities either closeted or out of discussion. Renkin provides an amazing
account of how this culture clashed with a newer queer generation more willing to explore its
identity. Many of the older LGBT+ members advocated for incorporating nationalist symbols,
removing “excessiveness” and “decadence” from Marches, and excluding less well-known
identities, such as drag queens, asexuals, non-binary and genderqueer people from participating.
Defending these practices as preventative measures, such politics created permanent wedges
between liberal and conservative queers.74 Over time, the expansion of Europeanization and the
internet has fuelled younger LGBT+ members into the liberal and radical camps, where they
largely express their identities on grounds similar to their Western counterparts. Modern LGBT+
identity, in this sense, has largely “globalized,” with English signs, Pride flags, rainbow colors,
and internet references growing commonplace.75
Other major faultlines exist by class, gender identity, and location. Rural, lower class, and
trasngender LGBT+ Poles and Hungarians have much less access to queer spaces, are at a higher
risk of discrimination and violence, and are undercovered by human and LGBT+ rights NGOs.76
Middle and upper class LGBT+ Poles and Hungarians, in turn, fill the ranks of advocacy NGOs
such as Kampania Przeciw Homofobii (Campaign Against Homophobia) in Poland or Szivárvány
Misszió Alapítvány (Rainbow Mission Foundation) in Hungary. They also have the means to
emigrate, greater involvement in prior governments (the Civic Platform, for example, has fielded
several wealthy LGBT candidates), and are astronomically more likely to complete their
education.77 This environment has given LGBT+ rights in Poland and Hungary a “neocolonial”
veneer, according to Binnie, as major cities are seen as bastions of tolerance against a bigoted,
backwards countryside.78 Left-wing critics (Binnie included), argue that this veneer is a
byproduct of upper class queer inclusion in global capitalism, and ultimately damages LGBT+
rights activism by presenting these issues as part of the “elitist” neoliberal policies that have
brought havoc to millions of Poles and Hungarians. Lower class LGBT+ people, like their cishetero counterparts, are far more likely to see NGOs as unrepresentative, and thus engage far less
in their campaigns.79
This divide does not keep lower class LGBT+ people from activism, but rather shapes the
advocacy networks and politics themselves. The backlash against the LGBT+ community has
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also emboldened its more marginalized members, especially from the transgender and nonbinary community, into extremist politics. The most noteworthy of these, Stop Bzdurom (Stop
the Bullshit), is a queer anarchist group that has been implicated in several incidents of
vandalism and (alleged) violence against anti-LGBT+ advocates. Stop Bzdurom gained
international attention after the arrest and hunger strike of its founder, Margot, prompting several
riots countered with severe police action (see Appendix, Figure E).80 Since its inception, Stop
Bzdurom has raised hundreds of thousands of euros, indicating a shift towards radical action not
seen in the West for several decades. As one might imagine, more moderate LGBT+ members,
including all major NGOs, have denounced such politics, which, in turn, brings further conflict
within the community.
Overall, however, little distinguishes the values of LGBT+ Poles and Hungarians from
others of their generation. Many still identify as Catholic, some maintain a Euroscepticism no
different from their governments, and several I have spoken to firmly believe in elements of
Fidesz and PiS’ trauma narratives.81 In following research on national trauma, one can easily
argue that the constant conflict between member’s national and sexual/gender identiy creates a
more extractive mental toll than their cis-hetero neighbors.
As this conflict of identity intensifies, the LGBT+ community only finds itself fracturing
further. One critical element of this fracturing is the emigration of thousands of LGBT+ Poles
and Hungarians, who justifiably flee violence and harassment but weaken what community
remains. The costs of this emigration cannot be understated; individuals testify to closing contact
with families and friends, feeling isolated from their native culture, and many remain doubtful of
possible return.82 Against the weakening community, the Polish and Hungarian governments can
continue their assaults with dwindling domestic opposition, spurring higher mental tolls and
greater emigration, until only the most disempowered remain. From a pragmatic perspective, this
fracturing is absolutely critical to these governments’ political strategies, as they provide a
relatively low-risk target for demagoguery.
But this very fracturing is also a sign of the larger tragedy of historical homophobia and
transphobia in these countries: the LGBT+ movement is only this disorganized because of its
own youth. The community had spent decades, if not centuries, in darkness, the identities it
encompasses shrouded in ignorance and shame, its members living in constant fear. For a few
years, and under intense resistance, the LGBT+ movement and the people it represents began to
reach for light and progress; in doing so, they courted the same neoliberal forces that devastated
not only their countrymen’s lives, but many of theirs as well. This cost has largely been ignored
in the imaginations of their governments, gleefully pinning them by association as arbiters of
thirty years of discord. The radicalism these governments claim is rampant within the community
are mere reactions to a worsening situation, and every outside attempt to aid the movement is

“Queer Without Fear [Crime Doesn’t Pay?]” Stop Bzdurom, 2021.
Ash, Lucy. “Inside Poland’s ‘LGBT-Free Zones’.” BBC, 21 Sep 2020.
82 Pronczuk, Monica. “In Poland, an L.G.B.T.Q. Migration as Homophobia Deepens.” The New York Times, 24 Apr
2021.
80
81

30

weaponized against them, as shall be demonstrated. There has been a single window in Poland
and Hungary for the LGBT+ community this century, and it is rapidly closing.
The Politics of Memory: Fidesz and PiS’ Efforts to Construct a “Culture of Trauma”
“God Bless the Hungarians…
We are proud of our forebears who fought for the survival, freedom and independence of our
country…
We promise to preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart in the storms
of the last century…
We are proud that our people have over the centuries defended Europe in a series of struggles
and enriched Europe’s common values with its talent and diligence…
We hold that after the decades of the twentieth century which led to a state of moral decay, we
have an abiding need for spiritual and intellectual renewal….
We believe that our children and grandchildren will make Hungary great again with their talent,
persistence and moral strength….
Our Fundamental Law shall be the basis of our legal order, it shall be an alliance among
Hungarians of the past, present and future.”
- Excerpts from the Preamble of the Fundamental Law, Hungary’s 2011 Constitution
“In Poland, gays are the new Jews” was a commonplace phrase among the LGBT+
community during the first administration of PiS. It not only plays on historical similarities to the
Interwar government’s widespread anti-Semitism, but also to a perceived history of widespread
marginalization by Catholic governments.83 This phrase, however, serves as a dual-critique of
Law and Justice’s many attempts to negate controversial parts of Polish history, which the
government collectively labels the polityka historyczna (Historical Policy). It represents a
massive effort to enshrine within Polish national consciousness what Michliq calls a “soothing
narrative” of unsullied victimhood and martyrdom.84
Before these governments can utilize national trauma against the LGBT+ community,
they have to incorporate it into collective memory. The polityka historyczna, and the other
policies detailed below, enable both governments not only to place the “chosen trauma” into
everyday consciousness, but to dominate it. Fidesz and PiS may maintain democratic institutions,
but their authoritarian obsession with controlling political and historical narratives in their
countries does little to democratize thought. Increasingly, these governments have demonstrated
immense intolerance to narratives that deviate from “national victimhood,” including those that
would support LGBT+ inclusion in these nations. Since LGBT+ discrimination in these countries
is seen through and justified by trauma narratives, the forced development of this narrative by
nearly every conceivable means the state can afford warrants examination.
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Once again, two lines of reasoning behind Fidesz and PiS’ obsession emerge, depending
on how much their leaders believe these narratives. In examining Israel, Schulman argues that
efforts to silence contradictory voices mirrors the “mass flight response” seen in trauma victims.
The trauma narrative is necessary for processing ontological pain, and alternative perspectives
risk that pain reemerging. As such, strong psychological incentives exist for limiting these
perspectives by any means.85 Though the intent of this paper is not to psychoanalyze either
government, it is clear that they are deeply uncomfortable with the complicated history of past
occupations, such as collaboration in the Holocaust. A pragmatic origin for these policies exists
as well; “crisis narratives” are vital to the charismatic legitimacy of both parties, and they are
thus incentivized to propagate these narratives whenever possible.86 Regardless of intention, both
governments have made considerable efforts towards enshrining a “culture of trauma,” and I will
show five elements of this culture: The use of memorials, museums, and other monuments; the
state capture of historical academia and suppression of academic counternarratives; the state
capture of media; the use of lustration; and the co-optation of cultural institutions.
Ironically, the justifications for this cultural development are often rooted in the trauma
narratives themselves. To both parties, “retaking” control of these institutions is vital to reverse
the course of national treason exemplified by the 1989 revolutions and liberalization - or, as the
Fundamental Law labels it, “spiritual revival.” Given that the nomenklatura-liberal elite
dominated many of these sectors prior to Fidesz and PiS’ rise to power, conspiracy theories of
their alleged efforts to further “weaken” Hungary and Poland through the media abound in
government rhetoric. Orbán has been quite vocal regarding his beliefs that only a loyal and
nationalist elite can counter this effort, which he claims emanates from the “Brussels
Bureaucrats” to better prepare Hungary for future invasion and dominance.87
In Poland, the government turns its populism against “anti-Polish” cultural figures
through the pedagogika wstydy (pedagogy of shame) conspiracy theory. According to this
theory, much of academia and the old intellectual center of Solidarność has unwittingly become
a victim of Western “political correctness,” which has been deliberately designed to encourage
Poles to denounce their national identity and heritage.88 The Historical Policy, then, is the
obvious counter to this infestation of anti-Polish sentiment which, again, is a primer for future
EU invasion. Its utilization simultaneously allows PiS to deny other dissident voices a legitimate
claim to Solidarność; Stanley and Stanley have written about the tremendous importance of the
trade union’s legacy in Polish politics. Every major political party actively claims to have
inherited its tradition, and denying the opposition such claims allows PiS to revoke from them a
certain degree of “Polishness” that has proved valuable among voters.89
In fact, PiS utilizes its influence over the current leadership of the trade union to engage
in what could be called “legitimacy clashes” against prominent historical Solidarity leaders. This
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was most visible when the union claimed ownership over materials displayed at the European
Solidarity Center, a museum complex built out of the husk of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk,
where the Solidarity Protests first began. The ESC, as Solidarność has contemptibly noted, is
sponsored by opposition figures like Adam Michnik and Lech Wałęsa, whose liberal policies
they blame for the closure of the Shipyard decades ago. Wałęsa, in turn, calls the modern union a
puppet of PiS, a party composed of “fake activists who weren’t even arrested by the Soviets.”90
The fact that these conflicts are still emerging forty years later demonstrates the importance of
historical narratives to Law and Justice, and merely one aspect of the massive infrastructure it
has built to this end.
Memorialization
The most evident state-cultural linkage of national trauma, in any polity, is the
construction of memorials and other commemorative works. These are designed not only to
commemorate exemplary or martyrous citizens, but to illustrate national mythology.
Unsurprisingly, both governments have zealously released hundreds of memorials during their
rule confirming chosen traumas. Orbán, for instance, initiated the construction of the House of
Terror, a museum placed in the former KGB headquarters, which displays the horrors inflicted
by the Communist and Nazi regimes while ignoring the contributions of Hungarians to both (see
Appendix, Figure F). Kaczyński ordered the construction of the Warsaw Rising Museum, which
promotes the narrative that non-Jewish Poles were as much a target of the Nazis as the Jews.91
Of the two, Fidesz has spent more of its growing Cultural Ministry budget on dozens of
memorials to Trianon, both in Budapest and small border towns. Horthy’s government and his
“heroic efforts” to reverse the Treaty have been given special attention by Fidesz as a Hungarian
golden age, to the extent that swathes of Budapest have been remodeled to match Horthy-era
appearances through contracts with Fidesz-aligned construction companies. Benazzo claims that
this intense memorialization has likely created more outrage over the Treaty than in prior
generations, including those who experienced it.92
This lionization of Horthy deliberately overshadows any discussion of his anti-Semitism
and collaboration with Hitler; as shall be seen, revisionism surrounding the Holocaust is a
primary theme of both Historical Policies. Both parties show fierce intolerance towards any
discussion of the genocidal acts performed by Polish and Hungarian collaborators, which is a
glaring contradiction to their victimhood narratives. This revisionism is reinforced in other
memorials, such as the Monument to the Victims of the German Occupation, which was widely
criticized for depicting Hungary as an innocent victim in World War II (see Appendix, Figure
G). The memorial led Nobel Prize laureate and Shoah survivor Elie Wiesel to rescind a state
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honor in protest to the government’s “whitewashing.”93 PiS unsuccessfully pressured the
Warsaw Museum of the History of the Polish Jews to remove any mention of the Jedwabne
pogrom, in which hundreds of Jews were murdered by their neighbors with light German
supervision.94
In 2016, PiS released the Ulma Family Museum of Poles Who Saved Jews in World War
II on a site close to Auschwitz-Birkenau. Along with the Chapel of Remembrance administered
by PiS ally Tadeusz Rydzyk, it commemorates the 7,000 Poles listed as “Righteous Among the
Nations,” who sacrificed their lives to save targeted Jews and were, to the exclusion of PiS’
narrative, often violently reprimanded by their own communities. The Righteous Among the
Nations are frequently used by PiS as evidence that widespread allegations of Holocaust
collaboration are part of the “pedagogy of shame.” Similarly, Mária Schmidt, a former advisor to
Orbán and the director of the House of Terror since its opening, announced plans to initiate a
Holocaust museum called the House of Fates. The museum would portray, in Schmidt’s words,
“an uplifting story of love between Hungarian Jews and non-Jews.”95 This museum rapidly lost
the support of the Jewish organizations it planned to work with, but demonstrates the audacity
with which both governments have pursued historical negation in their monuments.96
The constant release of memorials allows Fidesz and PiS to propagate trauma narratives
not only by broadcasting these memorials through state-aligned media, but also through the
hundreds of commemorative speeches opined by party members. These have become a breeding
ground for “trauma politics”: one example comes from László Kövér, the current Speaker of the
National Assembly, who attacked adherents of “political correctness” in his speech on the
opening of Monument of National Martyrs in Budapest:
“[Béla Kun’s Communists], who took the entire country hostage, were driven by angry
anti-Christianism, ardent internationalism, an intense hate of the nation, a conscious effort to
disintegrate families… In 1919, those who denied God, homeland and nation called your
grandfathers bourgeois… today, they call us nationalist, populist, anti-European, xenophobic,
Islamophobic, homophobic, and who knows what else just because we stick to our communities,
our culture, our traditions. Don’t have any doubts that if you allow them, they will come back
and stamp your children, your grandchildren. The descendants of Lenin’s boys are still standing
in front of us today.”97
The memorials provide a massive cultural and political playground for both parties to
inculcate their images of Hungarian and Polish history, and provide a persistent media space to
export them to their citizens. It is, by far, the most direct effort through which both governments
enshrine national trauma narratives.
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Usurpation of Academic Institutions
I have already mentioned Fidesz and PiS’ opposition to academia; the entire discourse
around the “pedagogy of shame” emerged after an accredited historian published a book
detailing the Jedwabne pogrom.98 Orbán has occasionally taken it further, constructing entire
speeches around criticizing individual “anti-Hungarian” university professors.99 These attacks
will transfer into policy: Orbán notoriously banned the entire academic field of gender studies
over its alleged danger to the Hungarian nation. Fidesz is also quick to deny state funding and
even accreditation to schools that do not comply with their narratives. Premier among these was
the Budapest branch of the Central European University, directed by Michael Ignatieff and
funded largely by Soros. After a long legal battle, CEU ceased operations in Hungary when
Orbán had higher education legislation amended to specifically target the institution. CEU,
which he has called “Soros University” on several occasions, was an early victim of his heated
political battle with the billionaire, who is often portrayed by both governments as a mastermind
behind their conspiracy theories.100
The Polish Ministry of Justice, under the purview of the ultra-Catholic Zbigniew Ziobro,
has increasingly utilized Poland’s Blasphemy Law to arrest academics and queer activists who
“offend religious feelings.” In 2015, authorities used the legislation to investigate Kampania
Przeciw Homofobii founder and Słupsk Mayor Robert Biedroń under allegations of removing a
portrait of John Paul II in his office. In 2019, Szymon Niemiec, a priest of the United Episcopal
Catholic Church and organizer of Poland’s first Equality March, was interrogated by police after
giving mass to Equality March attendees. In the same year, Elżbieta Podleśna was arrested for
publishing an artwork depicting the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, a famous religious and
national icon, under a rainbow halo (see Appendix, Figure H). Ziobro has funded several
academic institutions to investigate claims of “rising Christianophobia.”101
The negative press garnered by these stunts, however, have prompted both parties to
subtler tactics. Fidesz, for instance, has utilized its Cultural Fund to subsidize and publish the
works of the far-right nationalist pseudo-academics I discussed earlier. As one might expect,
controversy around these author’s racist, Islamophobic, and anti-LGBT beliefs abound.102 PiS, in
turn, has co-opted the largest historical society in Poland: the Instytut Pamięci Narodowej –
Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu (Institute for National Remembrance
– Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes Against the Polish Nation, IPN). It was initially
founded in 1998 as a hybrid historical registrar and prosecutor’s office for Nazi and Soviet era
crimes against humanity (which have no statute of limitations). It also provides education
materials and recommendations for street and monument name changes.103 The IPN has become
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the largest employer of history graduates and doctorates in the country. During PiS’ initial
leadership, it was widely criticized for its ties to the government, its “rapid fire” and
unsubstantiated historiography, and for opening a “lustration bureau” under the direct control of
PiS. When PiS returned to power, it forced the resignation of the majority of IPN’s board of
directors, replacing them with party supporters.104
This PiS meddling eventually culminated in the party, under IPN’s recommendation,
attempting to pass legislation imposing massive restrictions on speech to, in the words of Ziobro,
“defend the good name of Poland.” The law in part reads:
1. Whoever claims, publicly and contrary to the facts, that the Polish Nation is
responsible or co-responsible for Nazi crimes committed by the Third Reich… or for other
felonies that constitute crimes against peace, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or whoever
otherwise grossly diminishes the responsibility of the true perpetrators of said crimes—shall be
liable to a fine or imprisonment for up to 3 years. The sentence shall be made public.”
Understandably, this legislative revisionism sparked mass international outcry, and PiS
attempted to defend its decision with rhetoric such as that offered by then Prime Minister Szydlo:
“We Poles were victims, as were the Jews… it is the duty of every Pole to defend our country’s
good name.”105 PiS would pull back the legislation as a diplomatic crisis with Israel loomed, but
little has been done to stem an increasingly partisan historical institute; one that has persistently
repeated claims confirming PiS’ trauma narrative.
Unsurprisingly, both Fidesz and PiS have published history textbooks promoting their
respective trauma narratives, with Schmidt in Hungary and the IPN in Poland being core parts of
the educational approval process. This whitewashing goes beyond defending past crimes;
Benazzo finds that Hungarian figures that were Jewish or homosexual have these aspects of their
identity erased.106
The combined efforts to silence voices of opposition in academia and replace them with
trauma-endorsed substitutes represent not only a concerted effort to control the historical
narrative, but to remove a vital branch of support to the LGBT+ community in particular and the
human rights movement in general by strangling its strongest voices.
Media Co-optation
The largest targets of Fidesz and PiS’ “revolutions,” however, have always been media
organizations. PiS created similar board reshuffles in state media companies as it did in the IPN,
and has imposed heavy taxation on foreign media outlets to deliberately squeeze them from
Polish airwaves and newspaper stands. It has been alleged to use private contacts, such as
Tadeusz Rydzyk, the host of the ultra-Catholic Radio Maryja, to acquire local newspaper and
radio networks. Reporters Without Borders alleges that opposition journalists are discriminately
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targeted by COVID-19 lockdown authorities. Since PiS has come to power, the organization has
dropped Poland’s placement on the Press Freedom Index from 16th to 62nd.107
Fidesz has employed similar tactics; in 2010, it shortened the duration of press licenses to
better deny opposition outlets legal practice. Orbán has relied on a network of Fidesz-aligned
elites to construct massive media empires; one ally, for example, consolidated 435 newspapers
into a single outlet.108 These networks largely rely on government subsidies for continued
operation, coinciding with an expansion of the state in advertising, to the point that 30% of all ad
revenue in Hungary comes from Fidesz’ coffers.109 In both Poland and Hungary, pro-government
outlets not only spew homophobic propaganda, but are occasionally required to do so; Hungarian
police have organized raids on Western outlets that have publicly advocated for LGBT+
rights.110
These media outlets are used to constantly reinforce Fidesz’ crisis narratives,
occasionally bolstered by National Consultations. The National Consultations are semi-official
plebiscites distributed by Fidesz at election sites; though they carry no governmental obligation,
Orbán relies on them as instruments of his populist legitimacy. The Consultations largely deal
with “national trauma” social issues, and the questioning is often framed within the
government’s narratives. For example, a 2018 Consultation asked Hungarians to weigh their
opinions on an alleged conspiracy by George Soros to force migrant quotas on Hungary. This
was bolstered by a large advertising campaign depicting a demonic Soros pulling crowds of
migrants on puppet strings. This plan was an invention of Fidesz, but still saw 97% support
among voters, since most of the Hungarian opposition boycotted the vote and the Consultation
did not reach a majority turnout. Undeterred, Fidesz and its media allies utilized the Consultation
as evidence of the popularity of Orbán’s anti-immigration policies. A similar Consultation,
designed to legitimize Orbán’s anti-LGBT politics was held in April this year, with similarly
biased questions and a massive media campaign. They read:
-“Do you support the teaching of sexual orientation to minors in public education
institutions without parental consent?
-Do you support the promotion of sex reassignment therapy for underage children?
-Do you support the unrestricted exposure of underage children to sexually explicit
media content that may affect their development?
- Do you support the showing of sex-change media content to minors?”111
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The use of these Consultations, and their constant advertisement by state-aligned media,
demonstrate the vitality and magnitude by which Fidesz rely on crisis narratives, of which
appeals to trauma play an important role. It similarly demonstrates that anti-LGBT measures are
not merely a government side-project, but an electoral priority. Homophobic campaigns by PiSaligned media during the 2020 elections signal a similar importance in the Polish government.
Weaponizing Lustration and Cultural Funding
Polish state-aligned media also plays an important part in escalating coverage of
lustration cases, orchestrated by IPN and still commencing thirty years after the collapse of the
People’s Republic. Under President Kaczyński in 2007, lustration laws were expanded both in
scope and scale; where before only 27,000 government positions were under IPN scrutiny, the
new law covered 200,000. IPN was and is incapable of administering this expansion; instead,
they were pushed to publish certificates proclaiming “evidence of collaboration” that, while not
prompting prosecution, opened individuals to civil litigation. In reality, the qualifications for
certificates have far lower criteria, such as the testimony of a single witness. It allowed the IPN
to rapidly produce unofficial convictions, which were then given widespread coverage by statealigned media to inflict serious reputational harm against the accused.
Unsurprisingly, these certificates have been distributed along intensely partisan lines.
Critics of the regime, including authors and celebrities, and major political figures, such as
Wałęsa, have been accused of Soviet collaboration. Given their ability to destroy careers and
lives, the IPN has infrastructure to remove these certificates upon further examination of
evidence. This evidence, however, has to be provided by the offended party, and of the 20,000
applications for “injured status,” only 7,000 have succeeded. Since declarations of injured status
garner little media attention, the damage dealt is largely irreversible.
Beyond lustration expansion serving as PiS’ primary electoral promise, there are several
reasons behind Poland’s new lustration policies. The removal of political rivals is obvious; but
its influence on trauma narratives is less so. Through consistent coverage of the certificates, the
government is able to constantly reinforce its political narratives of continued anti-Polish
treason, of Soviet influences in opposition parties, of the betrayal of Solidarity by “global” elites.
Just like the Consultations for Fidesz, this furthers the mandate of Law and Justice to impose
ever harsher measures as the number of enemies seems to increase.112
Lustration is also a tool for PiS’ greatest ally, the Polish Catholic Church. Not only does
this constant promotion of scandals keep attention away from growing allegations against the
Church, but the body itself is, after PiS reform, immune to certificates despite widespread
evidence of direct collaboration between Polish bishops and KGB officials.113 Law and Justice
zealously defends the Church in its many scandals, and utilizes aligned media to suppress or
distort such allegations. One noteworthy example emerged after the release of a documentary
detailing child sexual abuse scandals by major clergy members. Kaczyński shouted to the press
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that “Whoever wants to attack and destroy the Polish nation first attacks the Catholic Church,”
before blaming the “rise in pedophilia” evident in these scandals to the growth of the LGBT+
rights movement.114
One should be reminded that the wide reach of the Church is also a massive platform for
homophobia and transphobia, interspersed with appeals to trauma. The Archbishop of Kraków
once told his mass, “The red pestilence that once marched across our land is no more, but a new,
neo-Marxist one has appeared… a rainbow plague.”115 Others have claimed that LGBT+ people
contributed to the development of Communism and Nazism, that it “seduces” youth to “captivity
and depravity.” These statements are usually celebrated on Polish state media; the “rainbow
threat” was the most-mentioned topic in Polish magazines in 2021, and conversion therapy
clinics are often broadcasted on local networks. There is little doubt that the Church, often
portrayed as “a fortress of Polishness” under threat of destruction, is the primary advocate of
aggressive anti-LGBT+ policies in Poland.
Fidesz’ relationship with the Church is far less cordial; if anything, churches have been
similarly victimized with other major cultural institutions as pawns in Hungary’s “spiritual
revival.” Fidesz and its elite allies have prioritized the co-optation of artistic and cultural
institutions throughout the country. This has largely been orchestrated by the Hungarian
Academy of Arts (HAA) and its National Cultural Fund, both of which were endowed by the
2011 Fundamental Law. The HAA oversees exhibitions, rewards prominent Hungarian artists,
and administers government grants; unsurprisingly, these are all distributed on partisan lines (see
Appendix, Figure I).116 Of particular note, the National Cultural Fund has been used to subsidize
a number of nationalist cottage industries in Hungarian localities that extend the reach of the
trauma narrative outside of the urban artistic centers that the government has more difficulty
influencing. Shops selling T-shirts celebrating Horthy, wood-cuts depicting Hungary’s preTrianon borders, folk music CDs and other paraphernalia have exponentially grown (see
Appendix, Figure J). Nearly every major Hungarian church and synagogue has, by government
order, initiated revitalization projects with HAA subsidies. This not only boosts Fidesz’
credibility as a “defender of the faith,” but gives them a powerful tool for clergy compliance; the
HAA is known to abruptly cease funding churches that are critical of the government.117
As earlier, elements of civil society that cannot be co-opted are uprooted instead. NGOs,
and particularly those supporting LGBT+ rights, have been under constant government scrutiny
for years, with both parties attacking them for alleged connections with Western governments
and elites like Soros.118 In Hungary, this climaxed with Fidesz passing legislation that requires
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NGOs receiving even small amounts of foreign donations to list themselves as “foreign funded”
on all official documents, advertisements, and material. In effect, it branded swathes of major
civil society organizations with an internationalist stigma both parties have taken decades to
build, further delegitimizing voices that run counter to their narrative.
All of these measures are blatantly authoritarian, and in fact these policies represent a
significant body of the criticisms levied against both governments. Some are designed to stifle
democratic opposition, others to control major facets of free expression. Many Western
journalists have argued that they represent mere power grabs, loosely sheathed in rhetorical
defense of “national revival” and “renewed revolution.” Their clear contradictions with the
democratic values Fidesz and PiS continue to espouse adds fuel to these arguments.
It is clear that both governments, through every means available to them, seek to enshrine
their political narrative into collective national consciousness. By rooting these narratives to
trauma, they can become sacrosanct and the fundamental means through which Polish and
Hungarian national identity is understood. By arguing that these beliefs are not only under threat,
but only understood by their party, Fidesz and PiS have created a nationwide charismatic
machine that, ideally, can only falter if the political targets it uses as fuel become irrelevant. As
each party’s vision of their nation becomes congruent with the collective, it becomes easier to
paint its opponents as enemies of the nation itself.
As the polityka historyczna and similar policies demonstrate, reference to trauma is
fundamental to these narratives. It not only encourages these “attacks” to be treated with intense
urgency by voters, but enables these allegations to maintain a repetitious character. The
hypervigilance national trauma incubates allow intense emotionalization and national
identification to overshadow what others see as clear political ploys, and both states craftily
utilize media, lustration, and other tools to keep reminders of past trauma at the forefront of
consciousness. The sheer magnitude through which Fidesz and PiS pursue these “memory
politics” give them a starltling influence over the memories and mentalities of their citizens,
whose outlooks are increasingly shaped towards their government’s ends.
The next section of this paper will illustrate what these ends are: further securitization of
the national body against all agents and all ideas that work against it, including those embodied
by the queer community. As traumatic feelings intensify, both governments feel increasingly
obliged towards pursuing more vicious efforts.
Invasion: Securitizing the LGBT+ Community as a Threat
“This is not why my parents’ generation for 40 years struggled to expel communist ideology
from schools, so that it could not be foisted on children, could not brainwash and indoctrinate
them. They did not fight so that we would now accept that another ideology, even more
destructive to man, would come along. LGBT is not people… it is an ideology.”
- Andrejz Duda, President of Poland, on the potential discussion of LGBT+ topics in
schools, June 13th, 2020.
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“We can never show solidarity with ideologies, peoples and ethnic groups which are committed
to the goal of changing the very European culture which forms the essence, meaning and
purpose of the European way of life. We must not show solidarity with groups and ideologies
which oppose the aims of European existence and culture, because that would lead to
surrender.”
- Viktor Orbán, Speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open, Băile Tuşnad, Romania, July
22nd, 2017.
“We are dealing with a direct attack on the family and children – the sexualization of children,
the entire LGBT movement… This is imported, but they today actually threaten our identity, our
nation, its continuation and therefore the Polish state.”
- Jarosław Kaczyński, then Leader of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, speaking at the University
of Technology in Gdańsk, March 30th, 2019.
Homophobia, like all intolerances, manifests in proximity. It is not necessarily the
existence of homosexuality that drives the hatred demonstrated by these governments, but its
visibility, the inevitable confrontation when those considered “Other” are, in fact, members of
one’s community.119 LGBT+ people exist without regards to religion, politics, or nation; this
irrefutable fact, and its anathemic incongruence with Hungarian and Polish nationalist
constructions of gender and sexuality, is the inspiration for both government’s campaigns.
The first objective of Fidesz and PiS in Othering queer identities, then, is to deny that
fact. They try to prove that LGBT+ people cannot belong within the collective identity and the
fundamental structures that create it. National trauma pushes the rest forward: since they cannot
belong, they must be from elsewhere; if they are from elsewhere, it must be intentional; since it
is intentional, they are clearly a threat. The government’s logic justifies treating LGBT people as
an issue of national security; the danger of “LGBT ideology” spreading prompts the government
to view queer identity as something to be quarantined. Their primary objective is to wall off
“vulnerable” Poles and Hungarians from what they perceive as an infection. The next section
will detail to whom both parties leave “cleansing.”
In this section, I will explore how both parties construct Christian and “family values” as
fundamental to national identity, how they dehumanize LGBT+ people as unwitting “ideological
agents,” and the material and legal measures by which these governments force LGBT+ people
from the national collective. In doing so, I will also demonstrate how appeals to trauma color and
justify policies towards increasing securitization.
“Christian” and “Family Values” in the Hungarian/Polish Model
The importance of Christian values in the government of PiS is already evident, to an
extent not shared by their southern ally. Orbán’s peculiar commitment to Christianity, and both
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parties’ incorporation of family values into national policy, need to be contextualized before
further analysis of anti-LGBT+ policies.
In Orbán’s rhetoric, Christianity serves less function as a religious lifestyle than it does as
an ethical bedrock for his definition of “Western Civilization.” Within the mythology, Hungary
did not become “Western” until it was converted by St. István, who is constantly celebrated by
Fidesz material and the Fundamental Law itself. Conversely, efforts to secularize or otherwise
“de-Christian” Hungary, as the Soviets flaccidly attempted, represent a return to Hungary’s
“Oriental heathenism” and the cultural decadence Fidesz argues that brings.120 Appeals to this
“Christian essence” and the Huntington “Clash of Civilizations” became the core of Orbán’s
anti-immigrant politics, and represented a new, more spiritual velocity for his attacks on the
nomenklatura and the “Brussels Bureaucrats.” As he argued:
“...[Syrian migrants] have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically
different culture… Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity. Is it not
worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe
Christian?”121
Fidesz, on its website, makes similar appeals:
“We believe that as a European nation we can only be successful if we respect Christian
values as the foundation of our culture and identity, and reject Marxist and progressive
ideologies that want to strip us of our roots.”122
The extension of this belief to LGBT+ discrimination is fairly straightforward. In the
party’s view, LGBT+ identities run counter to Christian beliefs on sexuality and gender. Since
Christianity is the bedrock of Western civilization, accomodation to LGBT+ rights represents a
collapse of the entire Western moral structure, and thus the civilization itself. As such, LGBT+
rights pose an existential, normative threat to Western, Hungarian, and Polish society, just as
prior invasions posed a physical threat.
Unfortunately for such proponents, LGBT+ identities are increasingly congruent with the
“Western values” of Hungary’s fellow EU states. Most Westerners would take issue with the
idea that LGBT+ communities are diametrically opposed to their cultures. Even Orbán himself is
aware that homosexuality is, at this point, a permanent fixture in Western identity; during his
anti-immigration phase, he openly decried Muslim migrants for attacking LGBT+ communities
and “spreading homophobia.”123
With this in mind, both governments have slowly pivoted towards “Central European”
family values, which creates greater distance between their Western European counterparts.
Fidesz started to publicly endorse a “family-friendly Hungary” in 2019 through the efforts of
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former Family Minister and current President Katalin Novák. As she explained at a
“Demographic Summit” held last year:
“In Hungary, the community’s fundamental building block is the family… The
preservation of our created world [from climate change] also entails the conservation of our
homes, our homeland, and our culture for generations to come… the family is being
attacked.”124
The Demographic Summit makes clear that Fidesz sees pro-family policies as vital to
resolving their country’s low birth rate and high quantity of youth emigration. It promotes these
policies externally as “The Hungarian Model.” The most substantive of their natalist programs
have emerged in welfare reform. Hungary’s recent tax laws, for instance, give substantial credits
to mothers who have multiple children, up to a full exemption.125 Childbearing has been
promoted zealously by the government, with Orbán declaring it the greatest and most vital
contribution a Hungarian woman can make toward “national revival.”126 One might recall that
most of Poland and Hungary’s family-based welfare infrastructure collapsed in early
liberalization; as such, these measures have gained immense popularity among some parents.
Nor are these measures simply material: Hungary has recently tightened access to divorce,
abortion, and aid for domestic violence. Fidesz has made it clear that it does not believe single
parent households provide proper stability for children, and have thus tried to limit parental
separation.
Poland, unsurprisingly, has adopted similar measures, including substantial state
subsidies for families with more than two children and an infamous, near total ban on
abortion.127 These governments advertize these policies heavily in their media empires. Both see
the “Hungarian/Polish Model” as an effective tool to popularize their governments with
conservative Western parties, including and especially the U.S. Republicans. To better court
Americans, both governments have hired former Republican political strategists, invited
American evangelical groups on state visits, and have tailored the Model to address prominent
social issues outside of Poland and Hungary.
By aligning with popular international appeal, however, both governments have damaged
the efficacy of their policies by ensuring that “model families” reflect bourgeois “Americana”
family appearance. These conflict with the historically large and multigenerational families seen
in pre-liberalization Hungary and Poland. Regardless, Hungarian and Polish state-aligned media
continuously proselytize to elderly voters that the Models are vital to keeping young couples in
smaller communities, where they might better care for their parents over Poland and Hungary’s
underdeveloped pension and senior care systems.128 Though one cannot yet determine the
Models’ success practically, they have clearly spirited both party’s older voting bases.
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The patriarchal and heteronormative structure of the Models, however, create
considerable hurdles in accessing welfare for those who do not comply with their government’s
construction of the family. Single-parent and Roma families continually slip through the state’s
welfare policies, and incidents of domestic violence continue to rise in both countries.129
Likewise, LGBT+ groups are usually denied access to these welfare policies on principle, adding
a material element to ongoing government discrimination. This is conjoined with both
government’s unwillingness to enforce anti-discrimination policies, forcing public LGBT+
people to risk the security of their jobs and homes as the expression of their identities becomes
increasingly politicized. If anything, these countries have actively targeted companies that
enforce EU-originating anti-discrimination laws. After firing an employee that sent homophobic
death threats through the company’s internal mail service, Poland’s Justice Ministry pursued
litigation against IKEA for infringing the “religious rights” of the terminated employee.130
The Hungarian and Polish governments have employed measures to ensure that LGBT+
people are incapable of legally raising a family, such as constitutional bans on same-sex
marriages and, in Hungary, on same-sex adoption. The Polish government has plans requiring
authorities to vet single-parent adoptions for a history of same-sex activity.131 Similarly, both
governments have ensured barriers preventing legal gender and name changes remain in place;
Transgender Poles have to pursue civil litigation against their parents, divorce their spouse, and
deny custody of their children to qualify for state gender change. Efforts to amend these criteria
have been repeatedly vetoed by President Duda.132 Hungary, as mentioned earlier, has made
gender assignments legally immutable, which has created obvious sources of difficulty for
transgender and intersex Hungarians wherever government documents are involved.133
Given the emphasis these governments have placed on the fundamental and spiritual
importance of families, both should be fully aware of the harm they cause by denying LGBT+
people access to building them. Regardless, this unequal denial is merely an undercurrent of
discrimination against the broader demonization of the community as a whole.
“LGBT Ideology”
PiS and Fidesz are hardly the first governments to utilize religious and family politics
against LGBT+ rights. They are, however, among the first to argue they are threats to the state.
Neither government believes that queer identities are natural developments, and thus flatly deny
the agency of LGBT+ people both in determining their identities and advocating for them as a
part of human rights. Rather, LGBT+ people are painted as dangerous, if occasionally unwitting,
traitorous conspirators, in line with the trauma narrative both governments use. They have been
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“infected,” not only by other LGBT+ people but by the liberal, nomenklatura, and Western elites
that seek to subjugate both countries by dismantling the “fundamental institutions” (the church
and family) that allowed Poland and Hungary to previously survive their invasions. Since both
parties see LGBT+ people as political agents, they must also dehumanize queer identities into a
purely political force, “LGBT Ideology,” that can be justifiably securtized like any other
“dangerous” political movement. The use of terms like “ideology,” “brainwash,” “deluge,” and
“invasion,” in reference to the LGBT+ community are deliberately utilized to recall past
occupations and the trauma that resulted.
Restricting LGBT+ rights is steeped in the language of trauma. During the Demographic
Conference, former U.S. Vice President Mike Pence commended Hungary for spending decades
against “the progressive fist of tyranny,” making an allusion between “LGBT Ideology” and the
Soviet Union.134 Fidesz has publicly broadcasted familiar allegations surrounding George Soros
and the LGBT+ rights movement, arguing that his dark money is being used to fund supposed
“gay/trans lobbies.”135 Through these connections, Fidesz and PiS deliberately incorporate
LGBT+ people as new antagonists in a decade-old narrative.
Before both parties grew too hostile to accommodate conservative queers, the use of
these alarmist phrases was also targeted to engage in what Hungarians call “szalámitaktika,” and
what the West calls “divide and conquer.” In the 2010s, both governments strongly implied that
“good” LGBT+ people, those who divested themselves of their community’s “activists”, were
not threats to Hungarian or Polish values. This further intensified the political and social tensions
in national queer communities I discussed in an earlier section. Over the past few years, this
language has dropped. Orbán now claims that such accommodation is hopeless and the
community beyond redemption.136
Despite its novel use, “LGBT ideology” did not originate in either country. Conspiracies
of a discrete “gay agenda” have haunted the movement from its nascence, and these have been
bolstered by the far-right concept of “gender ideology” that emerged in the early 2010s.137
“Gender ideology” escapes simple classification. Kuhar and Paternotte have argued that, across
Europe and North America, it has been used to represent a swathe of social rights and reforms.
These include reproduction rights, sex education, and measures against sexual and gender-based
violence. “Gender ideology” gives a conspiratorial face to efforts from ethicists, sociologists,
anthropologists, and others in academia, as well as affected groups in civil society, to redefine
traditional gender roles, sexuality, and gender identities as societal constructs. These partially
academic roots have allowed “anti-gender” campaigners, generally from similar ultra-right
parties as those mentioned previously, to tie these social movements into their larger opposition
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to the European Union, neoliberalism, and multiculturalism.138 The legacy of other European farright qualities, such as anti-Semitism and the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, are
evident; in the latter theory, feminism and LGBT+ rights are seen as attempts to “demasculinize”
white Europe and thus make it vulnerable to invasion. George Soros and other Jews are regularly
alleged to be masterminds of these plots.
Since Fidesz and PiS have already co-opted these conspiracies for their trauma narratives,
it is hardly surprising that their view of “LGBT ideology” is so similar. In particular, both parties
merge the ideology into the alleged threat of Europeanization. In the materials of both parties,
“LGBT+ activists” stand side-by-side “Brussels Bureaucrats,” and multiple politicians have
argued that the LGBT+ rights movement is “imported,” using the investment of Western-based
NGOs as evidence.139
To provide an example of how “LGBT+ ideology” can frame native LGBT+ people as
“foreign,” one can refer to the way Hungary’s President described transgender people in one
interview with a pro-government outlet. Novák counters the claims of European Commission
President von der Leyden that transgender rights are “fundamental to Europe” by arguing that no
concept for transgender people exists in the Hungarian language at all:
“[Gender ideological approaches] cannot really be understood in a Hungarian context.
If I ask someone what their sex is, they can answer it; but when I ask what their gender is, they
don’t really know what to say. The letters of the different ‘social genders’ are often not even
known to those who regularly use the term LGBTQ as a whip.”140
There is, in fact, a Hungarian phrase used by transgender people (the “social genders”
Novák ridiculed), just as there were gender-noncomforming identities before transgender
identities mainstreamed. However, Novák points to the recent adoption of these terms as further
evidence that transgender identities are inventions not merely incorporated, but contrived by the
EU as a political, rather than a real and experienced social identity.
As shall be extensively demonstrated here, the incorporation of “LGBT ideology” into
the trauma narrative promotes securitization against its perceived threat, and Fidesz and PiS both
maintain and encourage a hypervigilance surrounding gender politics that borders on paranoia.
For example, Hungary’s Foreign Minister, Zoltán Kovács, wrote extensively about his party’s
sudden reversal against ratifying the Istanbul Convention that sought to increase international
measures for preventing domestic violence. He claimed that the Convention had underhandedly
incorporated “gender ideology” in an attempt to challenge Hungarian sovereignty. In his words:
“Had the Convention stuck to the protection of women’s rights, Hungary would have
been among the first countries to ratify it… but the Convention went far beyond this… One of
these sections is found in Article 3(c), where the Convention defines “gender” as “socially
constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate
138
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for women and men.” This “social gender” definition, however, conflicts with Hungary’s
constitution because the clause denies that there are only two biological genders, male and
female. Without biological genders, for example, Hungary’s constitutional definition of marriage
(the matrimony of a man and a woman) would become void. By refusing the ratification of the
Convention, Hungary can say “Yes!” to protecting women and “no!” to gender ideology.”141
Similarly, Ziobro also made multiple attempts to escape the Treaty, calling it “a feminist
creation aimed at justifying gay ideology.”142
Polish state media has become a mass producer of this hypervigilance, utilizing its large
platform to broadcast these theories. By far, the most infamous example of such attacks is
Inwasja (Invasion), a thirty minute documentary produced by the state news network Telewizja
Polska (Polish Public Television, PPT), the most-watched network in Poland, several months
before the Presidential election. The documentary follows an alleged “undercover reporter” who
joins several prominent Equality Marches, not only alleging that many native “activists” receive
underhand payment by NGOs, but deliberately compares the “gay invasion” to Stalinization.
While libel suits eventually took this documentary off of airwaves, they only did so months after
PiS had achieved electoral success on their homophobic campaign (see Appendix, Figure K).143
The alarmist language populating the film and its producers’ rhetoric has had a
substantial effect on their voters' views: one Ipsos poll found that, even among younger Polish
men, a majority found that “LGBT and gender ideology” was the largest threat their country
faces in the 21st century.144 The leverage this provides the state for further “securitization” is
clear.
“Child Protection” and Norms Securitization
Both Fidesz and PiS would likely take more aggressive measures against the LGBT+
“threat” if they could, but the constraints placed both by the EU and political moderates are
insurmountable through official government means. The politicians of large cities such as
Warsaw, Kraków, and Budapest openly support LGBT+ rights; it was Mayor Trzaskowski’s
public support for the community that prompted the creation of the “Free Zones” in the first
place.145 The community is no longer invisible, as it was under state socialism; it cannot be
“cleansed.”
By incorporating the community as an antagonist in the trauma narrative, however, both
parties must find some way to heroically fight off and “save” their countries from LGBT+
people. With necessity and constraint in mind, both governments have sought to securitize
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LGBT+ not as an identity, but as a discourse. “LGBT+ ideology,” after all, is not necessarily
spread by individuals in the grander narrative, but through the same networks the government’s
other enemies utilize. The primary LGBT+ policy objective of both governments has been
making queer identities and advocacy as invisble as possible. Through a sort of nationwide
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” that can keep queer identities out of sight,both governments can claim
victory without resorting to violent ends. This has, so far, been achieved through what NunezMietz labels, “norms securitization.”
To briefly elaborate, most liberal human rights scholars argue that introducing new
human rights in societies previously lacking them require one to disseminate norms regarding
those rights through multiple facets of civil society. In order to spread human rights, one must
have the language to conceptualize, discuss, and implement them. “Norms dissemination” is a
tool towards that end. Norm dissemination was the clear objective of the LGBT visibility
campaigns I mentioned earlier; when positive images of the LGBT+ community are made
prominent, conversations about their civil needs can be better addressed, and hostility around the
subject dwindles as populations become less ignorant. Hungary and Poland’s cultural similarities
to Western Europe, with their post-colonial and post-totalitarian context, made them fertile
grounds for the implementation of these practices, as the growth of the LGBT+ and women’s
rights movements attest. The theoretical language surrounding norms dissemination is known by
both governments.
“Norms securitization,” then, seeks to strangle this process and thus better marginalize
the LGBT+ community from everyday society and politics. Norms securitization quite clearly
appeals to national trauma. The paramount desire to control collective narratives easily intersects
with the desire to incubate the group from outside threats.146 As before, Fidesz and PiS show a
deep desire to remove oppositional voices.
To provide a practical example of norm securitization, I must first discuss the efforts of
Fidesz and PiS politicians to portray the LGBT+ community as a direct threat to children. Both
parties frequently associate homosexuality with pedophilia or argue that the tolerance of one will
inevitably encourage the tolerance of the other, an age-old trope that proved as popular in state
socialist societies as it did in liberal Western ones.147 When Trzaskowski made his “Warsaw
Declaration,” Poland’s then Minister of Education, Dariusz Piontkowski, criticized it as “an
attempt to sexualize children by force,” that will “raise children to be taken away by pedophiles.”
Kaczyński called it “an overt attempt to sexualize infants.”148 Groups such as Kampanię Stop
Pedofilii, and far-right members of Parliament have campaigned in both countries to
constitutionally ban any promotion of “sexual deviancy,” which Jobbik described as
“homosexuality, sex changes, transvestism, bisexuality, and other pedophile behavior.”149 In the
first PiS cabinet, Roman Giertych, another Minister of Education, supported banning LGBT+
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people from teaching, as he argued it would create an unsafe environment for children.150 In this
spirit, Fidesz and PiS frequently claim “concern for the health of children” as justification for
imposing harsher anti-LGBT+ policies.
While vile, the tactic is well-calculated. Christian and family values might be
ideologically important to voters, but they remain incomparable to material concerns. By
focusing on children, Fidesz and PiS invent a material, identifiable stake for their voters, which
can grow increasingly urgent as more children explore their sexuality or gender identity. With
that in mind, anti-LGBT+ legislation has often been euphemistically phrased as “anti-pedophile,”
“pro-child,” or “children’s rights.”
The crown jewel of these efforts was a series of amendments passed by the National
Assembly in 2021, usually shortened as the “Child Protection Act,” or the “Anti-Pedophile Act”
in Fidesz media. In addition to dramatically increasing the state’s punitive capacity against child
sex offenders, the legislation also criminalized sharing information about homosexuality and
gender changes to Hungarian children. To realize this, Hungary banned any media from
mentioning LGBT+ topics during daytime hours (or permanently for child-targeted media), and
banned companies from advertising with LGBT+ symbols or speaking in support of the
community. Products using LGBT+ symbols were either destroyed, forced to change packaging,
or can only be shown to customers on personal request. The harshest aspects of the law emerged
with respect to “educational and religious facilities,” where “spreading” homosexual propaganda,
including through sex education and displaying LGBT+ symbols within 200 meters of said
facilities, would be considered a form of pedophilia.151
To better legitimize what immediately became one of the most controversial laws in the
European Union, Orbán transformed its provisions into a National Consultation, which I
displayed earlier.152 The costs to the LGBT+ community were tremendous. Hungary’s largest
LGBT+ rights NGO, Háttér Társaság, reported a spike in hate crimes against LGBT+ people,
including physical violence, in the days following the act’s passage. None were investigated by
the Hungarian government.153 International human rights NGOs showed open concern for
LGBT+ youth in the country, now at risk of incriminating their teachers by confiding in their
sexuality or asking for assistance against bullying or harassment. This indirect violence,
however, was not an explicit desire of Fidesz, who has continuously advocated that their bill only
bans “pedophile propaganda.”154
In conjunction with the constraints placed on “foreign-funded NGOs,” it represents a
serious limit on the ability of the LGBT+ rights movement to disseminate pro-LGBT+ norms.
Nobody can run an awareness campaign for their rights when mentioning those rights in print,
advertising, and television is criminal. Instead, the LGBT+ community is completely at the
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mercy of state-aligned media, which have continued to lambast queerphobic propaganda without
limitation. In Budapest, government-sponsored billboards plaster street corners with
denunciations of “LGBT+ activists” who seek to abuse Hungary’s children (see Appendix,
Figure L).155 This lackadaisical enforcement makes obvious the opposition to pro-LGBT+
norms, over a complete ban; both parties still need to publicly “fight” the “enemy” to secure
votes.
For LGBT+ activists and allies, however, the law is not conjecture: I have already
mentioned the police raids on media outlets that refuse to take down “pro-LGBT+” shows.156
Television pundits who speak in support of the community are immediately fired from state
controlled or aligned media networks.157 In two infamous cases, two children’s books depicting
same-sex parents (Micsoda család! or “What a Family!”) and transgender protagonists
(Meseorszag mindenkie, or “Fairy Tales are for Everyone”) were taken from store shelves after
the authors and distributors both were fined by the government.158
PiS has not yet joined Hungary in implementing such legislation, though it plans to do so,
and similarly put state funds into its rhetoric. PiS donates tens of millions of zloty to media
outlets and NGOs that lambast LGBT+ rights, such as the conservative magazine Gazeta Polska,
famous for distributing “LGBT Free” stickers to its readers. The magazine has seen its
advertising revenue grow by 2000% after contributions by state-aligned firms (see Appendix,
Figure M). The government has also redirected funding to “LGBT-Free Zones,” usually by
withdrawing funds for domestic violence prevention and prison maintenance.
The Child Protection Act exemplifies a familiar cycle: Fidesz, at Orbán’s lead, creates a
crisis narrative rooted in trauma (in this case “LGBT+ ideology”), forces the issue into the
political fore with its propagandistic machinery, and implements greater measures to silence
voices that dissent from the trauma narrative. The rooting in trauma is obvious not only in both
parties’ incorporation of LGBT+ people in the conspiracy theories of potential invasions and
genocides, but in the many referrels to prior occupations that have plagued both nations. Both
governments, for instance, have argued that pro-LGBT+ sex education is tantamount to Sovietera propaganda, and have compared Germany’s support for LGBT+ Poles and Hungarians to
Nazi support for Volksbund parties in WWII.
Many scholars have argued that these policies are pragmatic instruments. The Child
Protection Act, for instance, bears clear resemblance to anti-LGBT+ legislation passed by
Russia’s Vladimir Putin, an ideological ally of Orbán, in 2013.159 If so, the use of trauma to
bolster securitization arguments is being deliberately utilized for two reasons. One, it allows both
parties to extend their victimhood politics to the minorities they are attacking, which supports the
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moral legitimacy of their actions. If the nation is under siege, these policies appear more
justifiable. The second reason is more sinister: appeals to group solidarity and past terrors are
excellent instruments for strangling empathy, which is likely the single greatest emotional
counter to these policies. The deliberate use of “us vs. them” and other exclusionary rhetoric
force queer people out of the in-groups both parties have relentlessly argued should be the only
concern of patriotic Hungarians and Poles.
The costs of these policies to hundreds of thousands of their countrymen, however, are so
severe that both parties’ obvious electoral pragmatism comes into question. Neither party was
founded by power-grubbers, otherwise Orbán and the Kaczyński’s would have long ago taken
the easy and lucrative path of the nomenklatura they detest. They were idealists, and their
constant exportation of trauma narratives and willingness to villainize the LGBT+ community
speaks to that idealism. The trauma narratives are not merely espoused to seek votes, but are
genuinely believed by at least parts of both governments.
This idealism is poisonous to the LGBT+ community, as both governments cannot afford
and will not compromise on the narratives they have pushed themselves into. The next steps for
either country are difficult to predict, as both leaders are notorious for their spontaneity in
policy.160 If both parties seriously believe that LGBT+ people are child sexual abusers, there iss a
distinct possibility that the community will be included in the law’s other anti-pedophile
provisions. These include the creation of a national registry, restrictions on employment in
health, education, and government, and a ban on access to public spaces popular with children,
such as zoos and beaches.161 Nothing in either party’s rhetoric implies they have any
compunctures with such an implementation.
Beyond speculation, however, are the very real consequences endured by the queer
community as a result of these politics. Those costs, and both government’s use of trauma to
evade responsibility for creating them, will be thoroughly examined in the next and final section.
Exoneration: Utilizing National Trauma to Shift Responsibility
“We do not break taboos by stating that the mother is a woman, the father is a man, and that a
little girl has the right to grow up as a little girl and a little boy has the right to grow up as a
little boy. Today, we have to state things that are evident, and we must do this to protect the
majority - because the protection of minorities does not mean depriving the majority of their
rights… If we deprive children of the certainty that he/she is a boy or a girl, we are harming
them… The European Commission should act as guardian of the Treaties, but instead it has
taken on the role of prison guard and wishes to lock Member States in an ideological prison. I
could count countless documents in which gender ideological approaches that they want to force
on us appeared out of the blue.”
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Katalin Novák, then Hungarian Minister of Families and current President of Hungary,
on the European Commission’s report on government discrimination of LGBT+
identities, November 21st, 2020.
“Leszek Mezynski, a retired dairy farmer and deputy head of the regional council, said the
conservative district wanted to keep out migrants and liberal ideas like gay marriage to avoid,
‘civilazational suicide.’ But it is more concerned, he said, about losing the economic benefits
that flow from European Union farm subsidies, funding for new roads and other dollops of
cash.”
- Andrew Higgins of The New York Times, describing sentiments held by the PiSsupporting local council of Kobylin-Borzymy, a village in the Podlaskie Voivodeship and
self-declared “LGBT Free Zone.” October 26th, 2021.
“I feel bad in Poland. The President says I am not human. One of my friends was kicked out of
his house because he was gay. I don’t want to live in this country. I don’t want to have to fight
all the time, just when I want to go outside.”
- David Kufel, an 18-year old attendee of the Katowice Equality March, 2020.
At this point, it is evident that the language used by Fidesz and PiS matches those
encountered in genocidal regimes. Schick, in her analysis of how countries incorporate national
trauma, calls violence a climactic aspect of “acting out,” or the final stake when a collective
refuses to challenge its biases and narratives.162 National trauma narratives are evident in many
instances of genocide. In one example, Michael Ignatieff interviewed Serbian militias during the
Bosnian War, and was surprised by how many of them immediately defended their actions
through a story of national victimhood harking back 600 years.163 The politics of victimhood
enable increasingly depraved acts. Therefore, important to analyze how PiS and Fidesz’ “war on
gender” has created a real atmosphere of violence for their nation’s queer communities. I argue
that both governments are constrained from the anti-LGBT+ violence one observes in Chechnya.
Through national trauma, however, both governments have been able to export this violence
away from accountable hands and into those the EU cannot reasonably restrict: paramilitaries,
local police forces, pastors, doctors, and parents.
For all queer populations globally, violence is an especially acute concern, and its
domestic, informal and structural roots make it particularly difficult to regulate even in
progressive governments. However, this violence is rarely overseen and encouraged to the
magnitude observable in Poland and Hungary, where such hatred is excused with arguments
rooted in trauma and familiar alarms of imminent foreign occupation. Even moreso than in
justifying anti-LGBT+ policies, national trauma is utilized by both governments to excuse their
gross violations of human rights, and is where the narrative will be most clearly prominent.
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Diplomatic Constraints and the European Union
Within a few years, two actions of Poland’s Justice Ministry, led by the indefatigable
zealot Ziobro, finally galvanized the European Union against the Polish government. These were
the declared legal support for “LGBT-Free Zones,” and Ziobro’s efforts to have the Polish
Constitutional Court take precedence over all EU legislation.164 While both of these moves were
loudly celebrated by Fidesz, the rest of the EU took swift action, cutting development aid to any
declared “Free Zone” and forcing Ziobro to higher court. This fierceness, however, was deeply
delayed. For years, the Polish and Hungarian governments had willfully attacked LGBT+ rights
and the rule of law in general, even as they requested and indeed relied on EU funds for their
own country’s continued prosperity. Since both parties maintain complete control over their
legislation, the EU represents the largest constraining factor over both government’s behavior. It
is worth inquiring why so little has been done.
For one, both the EU and its nearest ally, the United States, have been mired in similar
crises to those encountered in Poland and Hungary, whose peripheral status has previously
prompted many Western leaders to excuse their governance as a temporary reaction to the
sudden onset of Europeanization, liberalization, and human rights. Poland and Hungary, despite
being member states to the European Union, are not always viewed as equals. Despite this, the
EU and United States have largely been led by parties sympathetic to Fidesz and PiS, or the
“Christian democracy” they claim to support. Donald Trump has spoken of both parties with
overwhelming condonement, and Fidesz’ former membership in the European People’s Party
within the European Parliament brought them support from leaders like Germany’s Angela
Merkel and Italy’s Silvio Burelsconi.165 The EPP’s prior dominance of the European Parliament
thus served to protect Hungary and Poland from more severe restrictions.
It is also safe to say that, until recently, many European leaders did not much care about
LGBT+ rights outside their borders. It was only a decade ago that the majority of EU member
states legalized same-sex marriage, and ratified the Treaty of Lisbon that afforded certain
employment protections. Since then, however, many Western European states have co-opted
LGBT+ rights as part of a greater push to redefine national identities around progressive values.
This “homonationalism” has prompted many priorly unconcerned EU leaders to view Hungary
and Poland’s actions, ironically, as attacks on fundamental European values.166 Though Fidesz
has especially worked to court right-wing and populist parties in the West, even center-right
parties throughout Europe and North America have demonstrated opposition to both parties'
politics. Most famously, the right-wing Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, publicly
advocated for Hungary’s removal from the EU after the passage of the Child Protection Act.167
These have been bolstered by a litany of diplomatic crises emanating from both countries' fierce
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utilization of trauma narratives: for example, Law and Justice have had tense relations with
Germany after the major EU power opened new relations with Russia. Law and Justice was also
implicated in a major scandal with Ireland after its then-Taoiseach, the openly gay Leo Varadkar,
was accused of child sex trafficking on state television.168
As long as both governments remain in power, Hungary and Poland cannot be forced
from the EU, as the vote to remove a member state is unanimous-minus-one. The growing
isolation of both countries, however, continues to galvanize this membership and EU
development funding. If either were to evaporate, Hungary and Poland’s economies and
governments would promptly collapse. As such, Orbán has recently been attempting to present
his governance style and anti-LGBT+ policies as distinct, Central European institutions in an
attempt to court right-wing governments in the other Visegrád countries and Eastern Europe, as
shall be seen below. These have found mixed success. PiS and Fidesz courted the populist
regimes of Slovakia’s Igor Matovič and Czechia’s Andrej Bubič, before both were removed from
power following corruption scandals, as well as the authoritarian Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia,
whose membership to the EU Orbán has proudly endorsed.169 Romania and the Baltic States,
despite widespread opposition to LGBT+ rights such as same-sex marriage and adoption, have
forcefully distanced themselves from both governments.
As long as this diplomatic situation persists, neither Hungary nor Poland can too
provocatively push against LGBT+ rights, even as their rhetoric continually stresses the need for
securitization. This pariah status has, however, given both governments ample opportunity to
utilize trauma narratives to further depict themselves as victims of European Union aggression.
They hope to allay the anxiety of their isolation to voters with an underdog story of Hungary and
Poland’s staunch defense against the LGBT ideological bullies and their neoliberal puppet
masters. Since much of the trauma narrative utilizes Poland and Hungary’s historic liminality
between Western and Eastern Europe to present both countries as “Bulwarks of Western
Civilization,” both governments have been brilliantly able to turn their narratives around. They
will proudly defend Western civilization from itself, as one of Orbán’s speeches exemplify:
The Brussels Bureaucrats are not far from “Homo Sovieticus,” those who wanted to
make everyone forget the two-thousand-year endeavor for a Christ-like man, they considered
respect for parents and family outdated junk, insisted that children should be raised only to
promote the party and the class struggle, and that life exists only in the material world, without a
spirit… They believe that our family ideals are outdated and oppressive and they insist that in
line with a progressive approach, children should wear trousers for six months and skirts for
another six months… Poland and Hungary reject these ideals, and we bear great responsibility
because we understand that these two countries don’t just represent their own citizens but also
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those millions of Europeans who are forced to keep their opinions to themselves in their home
countries.”170
Blame-Shifting, “Strong” Nationalism, and Retraumatization
Both parties similarly utilize national trauma to delegitimize queer suffering as
incomparable to the trauma both nations continue to suffer from. In congruence with their “child
protection” measures, Fidesz has often argued that it must choose between the human rights of
incompatible groups; providing LGBT+ rights actively takes away the right to life of other
Hungarians. It is with such logic that Gergely Gulyás, Orbán’s Chief of Staff, argued that the
child Protection Act was a compromise against further anti-LGBT+ legislation. He publicly
denounced critics who saw the Child Protection Act as,
“...harming basic human rights rather than as a child protection measure… We are not
advising anyone over 18 on how to live their lives. The Hungarian Constitution ensures human
dignity to everyone… regardless of how they live.”171
One Hungarian MP, Kinga Gál, accused the European Commission of wilfully neglecting
the discrimination ethnic Hungarians face in post-Trianon borders over “overblown” concerns
for the LGBT+ community, asking “Are some minorities to be protected by the EC and others
not?”172 Fidesz’ official website makes similar statements, continually stressing that these
“Hungarian victims” deserve more attention from human rights activists than “non-national
minorities” which includes immigrants and LGBT+ people.173 In Poland, PiS argues that
international human rights concerns over the “LGBT Ideology Free Zones” are further evidence
of the “Pedagogy of Shame,” designed to tarnish Poland’s international image before it is
invaded, as the Third Reich had done in 1939. Ziobro has publicly accused the Union of utilizing
“cultural blackmail” to force “same sex marriage and pedophilia” onto Poland.174 Jarosław
Kaczyński requested that the Commission not fall for the “myth” that Poland was an “antiSemitic, homophobic, and xenophobic country” before accusing the larger Union of desiring the
creation of a “Fourth Reich.”175
To push the claims of EU imperialism further, Orbán has created a narrative that his
politics are representative of a “Central European tradition” that is distinct from Western
European culture because of the traumas the region has endured. Per his argument, Western
Europe’s inability to understand the necessity of the Child Protection Act stems from their
experience as cultural colonizers, never facing cultural extinction:
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“For the educated Western public… a nation is now unacceptable, even suspicious.
Meanwhile, for [Central Europe, the nation] is an elementary condition of existence; it is as
natural as breathing. Our culture, Hungarian national culture... can only exist within us,
through us and by us. Without us, it becomes forever lost to the whole of humanity…At the same
time, the Tatar incursions, the rise of the Muslim world, Nazi occupation, Soviet occupation
and… the years of communism all combined to make the protection of the Carpathian Basin a
massive mission of national, Central European significance. Mutatis mutandis, similar processes
took place also in the realm of the Polish people and the territories of the Balkans. Here at the
border of Latin and Orthodox spirituality, at the frontier of the Western and Russian worlds, at
the fault line of Christian and Muslim civilisations, here life is more serious, the stakes are
always higher, the self-image of peoples and nations is always more contoured… In Central
Europe, every error or mistake can well be the last one ever made… every child is a new guard
post.”176
Orbán expresses similar views in several samizdat, online essays named after the
dissident presses of the late state socialist era. Presenting these as “hidden truths” against alleged
European Union censors, these blogs deliberately play into the trauma narrative by implying that
Orbán’s opposition to the Union mirrors his opposition to the Soviet occupation as a student.
Similar references to the collapse of the People’s Republic and Orbán’s speech at Nagy’s grave
decorate his attacks on the EU’s support of LGBT+ rights:
“A politician with ambitions for high office in Brussels must understand that Central
Europe will never surrender its Christian values, national culture and our belief in the
traditional – and, for us, the only – family model… A politician with ambitions for high office in
Brussels must never forget this. They would be making a mistake if, instead of accepting our
cultural and historical differences, they tried to force migrants on us or threatened us with
sanctions, withdrawal of funds, starving us out and other assorted torments.”177
In the most recent State of the Nation Address, Orbán accuses the Union of weaponizing
the rule-of-law as a means of forcing LGBT+ people onto Hungary, which he likewise proclaims
as anathema to Central European values:
“You have also lived through the imperialist tantrums of Brussels…we are on a different
wavelength from the Western European intellectual caste, their experts, policymakers and
opinion leaders. The fact that we are on two different wavelengths is beyond doubt… we think
differently about the family – and have even come to think differently about the binary structure
of society, based on women and men… they did not live under dictatorships, and their freedom is
inherited. We, however, lived under dictatorship. Freedom was not given to us: we fought for
it… For them, the rule of law is a tool with which they can mold us in their image. They are not
interested [in basic facts] or our arguments. They are now fighting a holy war: a rule-of-law
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jihad. And, my friends, words rarely help against jihad. Here we must show strength; so let our
Reconquista begin!”178
Orbán hopes, with these references to a “Central European identity” to compose a voting
bloc of Central European states that can more permanently enshrine anti-LGBT+ politics in the
region while simultaneously evading Western European scrutiny. This identity is, in effect, an
evolution of his trauma narrative; where once he resisted the Soviet’s efforts to drag Hungary
into the Orient, he now resists Occidental forces.179 By reinforcing this incompatability, he also
further enshrines the “Othering” of the queer Hungarian community. The more loudly the
European Union protests for their rights, the more readily Fidesz can point to such defense as
evidence of foreign collusion and imperialism. LGBT+ Hungarians cannot accept the EU’s aid
without further branding themselves as traitors and placing further targets on their backs. The
conspiracies of the Polish government create a similar situation for the LGBT+ community. All
resistance, or, as has been seen, simply and openly identifying as LGBT+, reinforces the trauma
narrative and justifies harsher policies.
This is not the only method through which both parties utilize national trauma to excuse
their human rights violations; the other major avenue is to portray restrictions on equal rights as a
necessary evil for protecting their nations from future trauma. Unsurprisingly, both parties see
LGBT+ norms as emasculating, borrowing from Great Replacement conspiracy theories that the
introduction of the LGBT+ community weakens their country’s defense capabilities. Orbán has
repeatedly proclaimed tolerance for the LGBT+ community as an unaffordable weakness.180
If anything, appeals to maintaining the strength of Hungary have become frequent tools
in Fidesz’ playbook: the current Foreign Secretary, Péter Szíjjártó, argues that the European
Union built on “strong states” with rigid family values.181 Novák argues that Europe’s strength is
reliant on “strong families,”182 and in commemorating the Trianon Treaty, Fidesz’ Deputy Prime
Minister, Zsolt Semjén, proclaimed that the only means to “move on” from “the agony of the
nation” is to “build a strong Hungary and a strong national identity.”183 Each of these leaders
specifies LGBT+ rights as ‘weakening’ the country, providing an overarching threat that their
acceptance could jeopardize the country when it faces its next, inevitable attack.
These arguments also color an occasional quality that distinctly appears in Fidesz’
rhetoric: pity. Whereas Law and Justice is far more unequivocal in their villainization of LGBT+
people, Orbán and his followers occasionally demonstrate brief lapses of compassion for the
community, as some of the previous examples have alluded to. From a rhetorical perspective,
Fidesz sees most queers as lost lambs who have ignorantly forsaken their national heritage for
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perverse ideals fed to them by the party’s enemies; in the tradition of these older homophobic
views, these queers are irredeemable and can only be protected against. Fidesz is quite vocal
about its belief that “LGBT ideology” harms its practitioners as much as the nation.
When the narrative is laid bare, however, one is surprised to find how well PiS and
Fidesz have succeeded in transferring their increasingly risky game of human rights
brinkmanship into the larger national trauma that has dominated their governance. This is most
evident in their ability to heroize themselves for the relentless attacks on minorities, furthering
the commemoration of past dissidents with comparisons to their “war on gender.” One speech by
Orbán deliberately paints his anti-immigrant and anti-LGBT+ policies as the climax in a long
fought battle against Hungary’s would-be oppressors.
“Over the last 30 years we have fought many great battles, but our biggest battle is about
to begin… There are national and democratic forces on the one side and international, antidemocratic forces on the other… [The Soros Empire] always takes aim at the heart, especially
when it is red, white and green… The history of the defeated is written by others, and the youth
of Western Europe will stand witness... If the dike collapses and the water flows in, the cultural
conquest will become irreversible. The country cannot afford to lose this battle because we may
not get another chance. Dear Hungarian youth, the homeland needs you, come and join us in our
fight so that when you need the homeland you’ll still have one… Go and fight for Hungary’s
freedom! Long live the homeland!”184
Fidesz and PiS have deliberately utilized national trauma to proclaim victimhood as they
victimize others. Arguments rooted in a traumatic worldview justify growing hostility to both
nation’s LGBT+ communities, and resistance to such hostility is then reframed by the narrative
into a repeated trauma. In so doing, both parties have created soundproof moral defenses for
relentlessly cruel policies that allow them to maintain popular support even as diplomatic crises
unfold. As shall be demonstrated, these trauma-based defenses are also used by individuals; the
government has created a political tool that can and is violently wielded against LGBT+ Poles
and Hungarians.
Government Enabling of Anti-LGBT+ Violence
Neither government has created a directly violent policy in regards to their LGBT+
communities; however, a consistent pattern of villainization has not only enabled a culture of
violence against queer Poles and Hungarians, but expanded it. Data on anti-LGBT+ violence is
difficult to acquire, in many cases because of deliberate government obstacles. However, I have
tried my best to identify what kinds of violence have increased, which perpetrators are behind it,
and where Fidesz and especially PiS are more thoroughly involved. In doing so, I hope to make
clear both the scale and the cost of Poland and Hungary’s anti-LGBT+, trauma-rooted narratives,
and demonstrate how these narratives shape the views andbehavior of everyday citizens.
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As mentioned before, LGBT+ populations globally are among the most vulnerable to
structural violence. Even in progressive states, LGB and especially transgender citizens are 2-10
times more likely to experience some form of violence than their hterosexual or cisgender
counterparts.185 This scale of violence relativizes its growth in Poland and Hungary. In continentwide surveys, such as those by the EU and ILGA, Polish and Hungarian queers report higher
instances of violence, but only by single digit percentages; in fact, the United Kingdom had
higher rates of violence than either country.186 These surveys have largely been conducted before
anti-LGBT+ politics were adopted by both governments, however, and are unlikely to be
updated due to constraints placed by said governments. Hungary’s Child Protection Act, for
instance, prevents a child-inclusive LGBT+ survey from legally being conducted. These efforts
mirror larger government efforts to dismantle enforcement against LGBT+ violence. Both
governments have severely defunded the institutions used for monitoring and reporting hate
crimes and employment and housing discrimination cases, leaving what little protections both
countries afford to gender and sexual minorities largely unenforced.187
Both governments have, through their legislation, placed further obstacles on preventing
and reporting LGBT+ violence. For instance, transgender Hungarians report serious difficulties
interacting with government officials stemming from an inability to change legal documents.188
Anti-bullying measures specifically for LGBT+ students have vanished with the Child Protection
Act.189 The government's rhetoric, in conjunction with both parties defunding state aid for
domestic violence prevention, have led to a deeply troubling spike in parental assault on LGBT+
children. The US State Department estimates that approximately 30% of LGBT+ youth in Poland
are homeless, with 10% being forced from their homes. These numbers are nearly triple
comparable statistics in the US.190 LGBT+ youth are, by far, the most vulnerable to violence, and
their dependency on both the state and their families have made them bear the fiercest costs of
their governments anti-LGBT+ policies.
Unofficial surveys run by groups that have run afoul of either government, like Campaign
Against Homophobia, paint an incredibly bleak picture: 65% of LGB and 80% of transgender
respondents reported experiencing violence over a two-year period. This was a substantial rise
from previous years, and corresponded with a rise in depression symptoms (85%) and attempted
suicide rates (55% overall, 74% for youth) across the entire population.191 There is no formal
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way to track LGBT+ suicides in Poland and Hungary, though it is known that they compose a
disproportionate amount in Western countries. The youth suicide rates in both countries have
risen substantially since both governments have initiated anti-LGBT+ campaigns. In Poland’s
case, youth suicides have doubled since PiS took power, becoming the highest in Europe. If
proportions are similar to those of the US, it can be conservatively estimated that hundreds of
LGBT+ children in Poland and Hungary take their own lives every year. Campaign Against
Homophobia, who found disproportionately high suicide rates in “Free Zones,” blames this rise
on the governments anti-LGBT+ campaign:
“These increases cannot be explained simply by a pandemic that has affected everyone. It
is clear that LGBT people are psychologically exhausted by the backlash. Participants in the
study wrote outright: ‘Parents and friends are becoming more radical, repeating nonsense about
the LGBT ideology and how we are a threat.”192
PiS and Fidesz have legislated an immensely hostile environment for LGBT+ youth at
school and in the home, despite forewarning from European Commission officials about such
costs. Their trauma narratives have become weapons for students, teachers, and parents to bring
against their peers, pupils, and children. They are continually encouraged to do so through
government rhetoric that demonizes the LGBT+. Think, for a moment, from a parent’s
perspective. Raising an LGBT+ child not only brings immense costs from an unsupportive
community, but is portrayed as treasonous through the government’s expansive media
machinery. The government’s trauma narrative forces parents to choose between their child’s
identity and their collective belonging: solutions from conversion therapy, to mental
institutionalization, to simple reactionary violence abound.
Even among the larger LGBT+ population, a surge in hate crimes has become a growing
concern. Most of these crimes occur in public spaces: on the street, while using public
transportation, in public parks, where multiple witnesses and even recorded footage are easy to
collect.193 Particularly vicious crimes have also increased. Multiple surveys report pastors
harassing queer congregation members during sermons, and surveys indicate that incidences of
“corrective rape” against non-heterosexual women have risen by up to 50%. Violence emerging
from medical workers is pernicious and concerning. Surveys report doctors giving harassing
comments, making excessive sexual contact with non-heterosexual women, forcing transgender
patients to take higher doses of hormone replacement therapy than are safe, or simply refusing to
treat patients upon learning their identity.194 This, in turn, leads to dramatically lower medical
turnout among queer Poles and Hungarians, and the obvious costs this incurs on quality of life.
Less than half of LGBT+ victims of physical assault, for example, seek medical attention.195
Regardless of evidence or severity, these hate crimes largely go unrecorded and
uninvestigated. Widespread distrust towards law enforcement prompt many Hungarian and
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Polish queers to keep quiet. Surveys demonstrated that only around 10% and 13% of Polish and
Hungarian hate crime victims, respectively, reported the incident to police forces.196 When such
crimes are reported, they are usually dismissed; respondents frequently report incidents of
further harassment or mockery by the police themselves. In several particularly jarring examples,
transgender women reported being forced to strip and have their genitals inspected by police
officers, before being forced from the building after their trans status was “certified.” To provide
an indicator of underreporting by police, the Polish authorities found 12 of its 874 official hate
crime cases to demonstrate homophobic or transphobic bias; Campaign Against Homophobia
found more victims of anti-LGBT+ violent crime among the respondents of their survey.197 In
Hungary, several police officers were sued after witnessing homophobic hate crimes take place
and doing nothing to intervene.
Put mildly, neither nation’s police forces have made efforts towards creating a positive
relationship with the LGBT+ community, or have implemented policies that worsen it. In
Poland, the Justice Ministry recently reclassified LGBT+ identities as “social pathologies” in all
new police materials, thus arguing that it indicated future criminality. The police have, likewise,
perpetrated anti-LGBT+ violence themselves. During the protests surrounding Margot’s arrest,
Warsaw’s police violently targeted visibly queer protestors and passersby and placed them in
what the country’s human rights ombudsman described as “degrading and at times inhumane
conditions.” A US State Department investigation reported that detainees were refused attorneys,
as well as access to food and water, and “excessive use of force” which Stop Bzdurom later
claimed was beatings. Such police brutality was avidly defended by Ziobro, who argued such
measures were “defensive,” and mirrored similarly flaccid excuses for a growing wave of police
arrests without proper legal justification.198
The growing hostility towards LGBT+ people not only from government officials, but
local and regional governmental institutions, has escalated into a major vector of violence in
Poland that PiS only barely avoids accountability for through its control of the courts.
Government Endorsement of Anti-LGBT+ Violence
As has become evident, PiS and Fidesz’ trauma narratives have enabled and sometimes
inspired “patriotic” Poles and Hungarians to more directly fight their nation’s “civilizational
threat.” By far, the greatest perpetrators of LGBT+ hate violence emerge from paramilitary
organizations and political militants. These organizations, many relics of the interwar years
permitted by a nostalgic government, have become major far-right nexuses with tens of
thousands of members. In Poland, these groups include the Młodzież Wszechpolska (The AllPolish Youth), which organizes attacks against self-titled “militant homosexualism”; Ruch
Narowdny (The National Movement), which has advocated for “public combat against the LGBT
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ideology,” and Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (National Revival of Poland) which led a “Faggotry
Forbidden” campaign with the slogan “a baton for every queer face.”199 In Hungary, Jobbik had
close ties to the Magyar Gárda Hagyományőrző és Kulturális Egyesület (Hungarian Guard for
Preservation of Traditions and Culture) for years, which recently split into a number of groups
reattached by Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement) as Jobbik cracked down on
radical elements. Mi Hazánk Mozgalom made headlines after one of its deputies, Dóra Dúró,
organized a press conference around throwing children’s books declared “homosexual
propaganda” in a paper shredder.200 These groups, and their history of attacking Equality
Marches with stones, Molotov cocktails, and violent threats have been mentioned several times
in this paper.
Fidesz does not support these organizations, but does little to stop them. Militant
organizations and leaders like Dúró have long been given access to parliamentary seats.201
Poland is worse; politicians with close ties to what are effectively paramilitaries have been
granted high-ranking positions in Law and Justice governments. Roman Giertych, founder of the
All-Polish Youth, was made Education Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and several
Sambroona cabinet ministers were removed after they were found to have ties to Belarus through
militant organizations. The government has since ensured it does not maintain direct ties with
political militant groups. However, it has encouraged the growth of state-endorsed paramilitaries
as escalations between Russia and Ukraine intensified. Many of these paramilitaries have close
ties and overlapping membership with militants.202 During the pandemic, these groups were
granted additional authority over COVID relief, despite opposition protests, and since the
Ukrainian conflict erupted into full scale invasion, armed paramilitaries have exceeded 100,000
members. Many of these groups feed directly into the military and police forces and are well
known for their “staunch conservative” values. PiS has argued that their expansion is necessary
to counter the “anti-Polish reputation” allegedly incurred by the military during the state socialist
era.203 However, evidence from the Strajk kobiet (Women’s Strike) in 2020 show evidence of
these groups also being used to fight PiS’ “war on gender.”
For brief context, the Strajk kobiet was a continuation of the feminist “Black Protests”
that occurred shortly after PiS took power in 2015, under a campaign for abortion rights,
secularisation of schools, protection from domestic and gender-based violence, and LGBT+
rights.204 In 2020, at Ziobro’s insistence, the PiS controlled Supreme Court of Poland declared
abortions due to malignant birth defects to be unconstitutional, creating a near total restriction on
abortion. The largest protests in the history of democratic Poland quickly developed. They were
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spurred on by calls to ban Przemysław Czarnek, Minister of Education, an acknowledged fascist
and supporter of such policies as legalizing corporal punishment in schools and banning Equality
Marchs, after he fervently demanded the mass arrest of protestors.205 Protestors quickly took to
the churches, which were widely considered complicit in the ban after it received open
endorsement by Pope Francis, and barraged masses with slogans, sit-ins, and signs. Infuriated,
many far-right militants declared themselves “defenders of the Church” and began harassing,
beating, and dragging protestors out of church halls. One leader, Robert Bąkiewicz, attacked the
protestors as “Neo-Bolshevists and anti-civilizationists” and proclaimed that he and a new farright union,
“Will defend every town, every church, every district, every village… I can say that a
sword of justice is hanging upon [the gender ideologues], and, if necessary, we will turn them
into dust and destroy this revolution.”206
Law and Justice did little to stem the growth of extrajudicial violence. Instead, they
endorsed it: one PiS MP, Tomasz Rzymkowski, commended the militants for “defending the
Church and all of Latin civilization against [these] barbarians.” Jarosław Kaczyński encouraged
more to mobilize on state television. The far-right duly obliged; even after the protests, militants
continue to hold massive rallies on national holidays, often co-opting city celebrations and
clashing with local police forces. One such demonstration in Warsaw, hosted by Bąkiewicz
under the slogan “Our Civilization, Our Rules,” featured posters depicting a winged hussar
trampling a rainbow flag from horseback, and homes that bore Pride flags were target with flares
and Molotov cocktails (see Appendix, Figure O).207 This was, again, encouraged by the Polish
government. Poland’s Minister of Culture and National Heritage, Piotr Gliński, gave Bąkiewicz’
group grants amounting to 3,000,000 zloty ($700,000) from the state’s “Patriotic Fund,”
claiming that these groups “serve to build patriotic attitudes” and “demonstrate a passion for
history.”208
PiS’ active encouragement of anti-LGBT+ militants is by far its most brazen and
indefensible act against the community, but with violence remaining the purview of these
“unaffiliated” organizations, the party can escape external accountability. To what extent,
however, can a government argue it has not started fires when it actively distributes kindling and
flint? The decision of Poland’s Defense Ministry to arm militant organizations is further
amplified as Poland receives large arm shipments from other NATO members. It has resulted in
an armed, trained, and extensive semi-official force with known ties to political extremists and a
particular hatred for queer people emerging in tandem with hostility from the government.
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As the moral deflections used by both parties evidence, national trauma has become a
tool through which both the Polish and Hungarian governments and their citizens target their
LGBT+ populations, at times violently. The demonstrable consequences of both government’s
anti-LGBT+ measures allow for direct comparisons to trauma-based campaigns of ethnic
violence and genocide observed in other instances, while making clear how dire the human rights
crisis has become. National trauma has torn apart communities, congregations, and especially
families as it is utilized against structurally vulnerable populations. In defending these costs as
necessary for the creation of “strong states” capable of overcoming imagined, trauma-induced
threats, both PiS and Fidesz demonstrate how sickeningly entrenched they and their voters have
become in the paranoia and violent traumatic flight inherent to the concept. Little else can be
reiterated beyond stressing that trauma narratives have real impacts on the perspective of the
collective, and that their utilization for demagoguery can escalate to catastrophic results.
Conclusion: Looking Forward by Looking Back
“The American political elite has become too stupid to face the truth… Simply put, the
leadership of the country hates the American people. But Viktor Orbán is defending democracy
against unaccountable billionaires, the non-governmental organizations, and certain Western
governments. He is fighting for democracy against those forces which would bury it.”
- Tucker Carlson, host of Tucker Carlson Tonight, the highest-rated television program in
the United States, on his visit to Hungary, August 21st, 2021.
“This is a witch hunt, where we are the victims. We are second-class citizens. It has never
happened before - we were simply never a subject. Now we are the subject, now we are the
public enemy. They are all against us.”
- Bartosz Staszewski, LGBT+ Rights Activist from Lublin, an “LGBT-Ideology Free
Zone,” October, 2020.
“HOMO HOMINI HOMO EST”
- Sign displayed at the 2017 Kraków Equality March
National trauma is the politicization, and often weaponization, of victimhood. It is the
phrase “Others hurt me, so I can hurt others” brought to a national scale. It is a powerful political
concoction, toying with citizens’s strongest emotions - grief, fear, belonging - and transforming
them into a policy of blind obedience and xenophobic exclusion. All humans, and the groups
they compose, experience trauma, and each must find their way to process both the pain itself
and how it shapes them. When a nation is locked in its trauma, however, it can only stagnate.
Through its culture, its politics, and its people, it keeps its eyes forever on its past, and
desperately fights against any force which might dare to move them beyond. National trauma is
the desperate plea of a beleaguered people that its hurt be recognized, and the horrid narcissism
that leads them to think their pain is exclusive in the world. National trauma, in any form, offers
no solution but deeper hatred, paranoia, ignorance, and isolation.
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At the beginning of this paper, I defined national trauma as a constructed interpretation of
past experiences that is then incorporated into the group and the present experiences it finds itself
in, bolstered by insecurities over one’s finances, one’s life, and one’s identity. Once
incorporated, the politics of the group becomes overwhelmed by a desire to enshrine its own
victimhood and avoid any future traumatic pain, at all costs. This normally requires a massive
crackdown of the state against both outsiders and those who would challenge the trauma
narrative. Almost inevitably, this obsession with security and victimhood lead one to violence
that the trauma narrative then provides exoneration for.
I have argued that PiS and Fidesz represent clear examples of national trauma in practice.
Both parties emerged from betrayal, both by a revolution that never materialized and by
supposed Western allies who seemed content with their permanent inequality. Within that
context, both parties began crafting trauma narratives: centuries of pain, backstabbing, cultural
suppression and unending humiliation. They began to see themselves in the light of the martyrs
that had inspired them, and they cried this narrative forward: “We have been hurt. We continue
to hurt, and those we put our faith in hurt us again. Our revolution and our freedom is
incomplete. Only through our party can the pain stop.”
They found an amicable crowd, one that had been continually decimated by decades of
economic mismanagement, corrupt and out-of-touch leaders, and a near collapse of many
societal structures that had once provided aid and community. It was furthered, accidentally, by a
mass opening of new social norms, including an increasingly visible LGBT+ community, free at
last from decades of terror. Europeanization and its effects left national identity deeply insecure.
And in insecurity, the appeal of past traumas tantalized voters to action.
Now that PiS and Fidesz had taken power, and their visions of their countries had become
mainstream, they began to “act out.” Both parties enveloped their countries in their trauma
narrative. This was not only done through hundreds of memorials, museums, and artistic
institutions, but by grinding down on any alternative voice that might resist their professed
victimhood. In this environment, NGOs, artists, activists, educators and the media suffered the
hardest. They were either driven out, forced into submission and co-optation, or replaced with
party men who fervently reminded Poland and Hungary that they were, first and foremost,
vulnerable.
How to remove that vulnerability? How to stop the pain of invasion, of oppression, of
betrayal from returning? It was here that LGBT+ people, and the alternative, “foreign” vision
their visibility represented for Poland and Hungary, came into the crossfire. Both governments
first villainized queer people as imports, accusing them of being unwitting foreign agents of
destruction, quiet daggers crafted to plunge Hungary and Poland into extinction. Now regarded
as a threat, LGBT+ people needed to be forced away from the nation, excised through policies
that denied them the right to national belonging, kept them materially and socially marginalized,
or simply banned them from spaces where their “ideology” could “infect” others.
If national trauma demanded this securitization, and the rigid control over group identity
that precipitated it, it also provided means through which both governments could avoid blame.
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Both parties refueled external criticism into further evidence of their trauma narrative, proof that
more securitization was required. Though neither government was willing to resort to violence,
their political narratives helped inspire countless others to do so. The results of this brutal antiLGBT+ campaign, rooted in national trauma, are evident to those willing to look. For the first
time in at least a generation, queer communities in Europe are at risk of a social cleansing of
national proportions.
The costs of “trauma politics” on Poland and Hungary’s nascent queer communities has
already been detailed, but what of the costs endured by nations who have only so briefly known
democratic rule? PiS and Fidesz have never had the full support of their countrymen, and their
belligerence plunges a knife ever deeper into the fabrics of their state and society. Communities
lose youthful minds fleeing in fear; families are torn apart over paranoid conspiracy theories; the
human rights of all Hungarians and Poles are placed in greater danger as governments
maniacally clamp down dissent. The very youth Fidesz and PiS claim to be saving have largely
turned their backs on them: “Generation Fidesz” and “Generation PiS” have a disdain for their
governments as deep as 1989.209 The Polish Church is on a warpath to ruin. Young priests,
disgusted by their elders, have revolted in a desperate effort to appeal to those they have
alienated, and a glue that has held rural Poland together for decades slowly dwindles away, like
the values it once claimed it upheld.210 Fidesz’ obsession with control leads to an inevitable
democratic decline. Even amidst unprecedented economic gains, fears of brain drain, cut foreign
investment, and EU sanctions hang overhead. Trauma has paralyzed these countries' politics, its
cultures, and many of the minds of its people. Regardless of PiS and Fidesz’ real beliefs of the
subject, their narratives strangle their nations.
The “Chosen Traumas” in 2022
Unfortunately, Hungary and Poland’s hatred impacts more than its own borders. One day,
as this paper was written, two major events dominated American newsstands. One was an
invasion of Ukraine by Russia that upended European geopolitics; the other, an effort by the
Governor of Texas, Greg Abbott, to charge parents of transgender children with child abuse for
allowing them access to affirming medical care.211 Both play a role in the future of Poland and
Hungary’s anti-LGBT+ politics. The hatred spewing from PiS is forgiven by their Western
adversaries over their ardent anti-Russian belligerism, and Poland has been given growing
quantities of military aid that finds its way into militant hands. Orbán, on the other hand, has had
his diplomatic maneuvering completely upended. Once Putin’s closest EU ally, the Prime
Minister has desperately pivoted his media machine away from LGBT+ rights and towards
damage control. Having only just secured reelection, it appears that the conflict has not only
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halted his anti-LGBT+ advance, but has galvanized his alliance with PiS, whose own trauma
narrative leads Poles belligerently against him.212
Orbán’s game with the LGBT+ community, however, is not over. Rather, the Hungarian
Model has become a key to his greatest source of foreign support: the Republican Party of the
US, whose endorsement of the events in Texas signal a gross reflection of Fidesz’ efforts to
villainize the LGBT+ community. Donald Trump’s defeat has sent the factionalized party into
freefall, and Orbán is working to inherit Trump’s mantle as the face of the populist right in the
West. Major Republicans, as well as conservative pundits like Tucker Carlson, have visited
Hungary with growing frequency in the last two years,213 and this year’s CPAC will be hosted in
Budapest. The Republican’s seemingly abrupt support for hundreds of anti-LGBT+ legislative
bills is not accidental. They are emulating what they have seen succeed.
The Ukraine conflict will not end state homophobia and transphobia in these countries;
even if their media stays silent, too many minds have been changed. This became evident during
Poland’s border crisis with Belarus in 2021, where Polish nationalist paramilitaries stationed
around the border demonstrated their loyalty to Poland by burning Pride flags.214 If the war in
Ukraine reaches a swift conclusion, Fidesz and PiS will be desperate to regain control of their
news feeds.
Whether or not the national trauma so diligently crafted by these parties survives, adapts
to the Ukrainian conflict, or moves to a new target remains to be seen, but in no case does its
culturation become healthy for the nation, its citizens, or its government. This is, perhaps, the
most harrowing aspect of the concept: that so many people, already so haunted and their
countries already so battered by the pasts of themselves, their parents and grandparents, would
deny themselves the opportunity to grow by instead submerging themselves in historic tragedies.
How much more pain is created by dwelling on past pain? A single question remains of this
vicious cycle of hurt begetting hurt. How does one stop it, as a government and as a society?
Given its relative nascence conceptually, and the immense difficulties in any
reconciliatory justice system, answers remain unclear. Electoral defeat of Fidesz and PiS still
seems grim, but it has not disrupted the efforts of millions of activists and ordinary citizens who
refuse to sacrifice truth and empathy for the altar of trauma their governments force on them.
They continue to speak out by a thousand means, including, for a few, this paper, and demand
recognition from their governments that being Hungarian or Polish does not require suffering
and vengeance. If their efforts succeed, then the national trauma enveloping their countries will
wither.
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Miłość to miłość. Nie zostaniemy ponownie wymazani.
A szerelem az szerelem. Nem leszünk többé törölve.
Love is love. We will not be erased again.

Appendix

Figure A: Police, in full riot gear, form a protective ring around the attendees of the 2019
Białystok Equality March, July 20th, 2019. The police broke through lines of counter-protestors
with the “March for Normalcy” with stun grenades and tear gas. (Muhammed Darwish, CNN)
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Figure B: Viktor Orbán at the Commemoration of the Calvary of Sátoraljaújhely, June 6th 2020.
The message on his podium translates to “No Hungarian is Alone - Trianon 100.” (Hungary
Today https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-at-trianon-100-event-hungary-is-winning-again/ )

Figure C: Viktor Orbán popularized his party, the Alliance of Young Democrats (FiDeSz) by
challenging Soviet dominion publicly at the reburial of Imre Nagy, who ushered a short-lived,
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independent social democracy in Hungary during the 1956 Revolution. Orbán was twenty-six
years old. June 16th, 1989. (László Kövér, Hungarian Spectrum,
https://hungarianspectrum.org/2013/03/27/whom-should-viktor-orban-fear-not-his-former-selfbut-the-rebellious-students )

Figure D: Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński, President Andrzej Duda, and Prime
Minister Mateusz Morawiecki meet at the National Security Bureau to discuss the Russian
Invasion of Ukraine, February 22nd, 2022. Coming to power after the resignation of many
moderate PiS members, the three have heavily utilized anti-LGBT+ rhetoric in recent electoral
campaigns (onet Wiadomości, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/atak-rosji-na-ukraine-andrzejduda-naradzil-sie-z-premierem-i-ministrami/2j0wl83 )
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Figure E: Police investigate a truck broadcasting the Stop Pedofilii campaign organized by the
Ultracatholic NGO Fundacja Pro – Prawo do Życia (Foundation Pro - Right to Life), August
26th, 2020. The truck displays messaging accusing LGBT+ people of pedophilia. These trucks
were implicated in several legal issues in 2020: one truck was vandalized, and its driver allegedly
assaulted, by the queer anarchist Margot, who was arrested for the incident. Activists filed a
lawsuit against Fundacja Pro for libel, but the Polish courts deemed such messaging
“informative and educational.” (Daniel Tilles, Notes from Poland).

Figure F: The House of Terror, constructed by Fidesz in 2002 under the direction of Orbán
advisor Mária Schmidt out of the remnants of the KGB’s Budapest office. The Museum displays
the brutalities inflicted on Hungarians during the German and Soviet occupations.
(https://www.budapest.com/city_guide/culture/museums/house_of_terror_museum.en.html )
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Figure G: Monument to the Victims of the German Occupation, constructed by Fidesz in
Budapest’s Liberty Square in 2013. Hungary, represented by the Archangel Gabriel, is torn apart
by an eagle, representing the German Reich. The monument was fiercely criticized for its
depiction of an innocent, Christlike Hungary, despite the country’s long collaboration with the
Nazis in World War II. (Wikimedia Commons, user Szilas,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d9/Monument_to_the_victims_of_the
_German_occupation_%282%29.jpg/1280pxMonument_to_the_victims_of_the_German_occupation_%282%29.jpg )
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Figure H: Tęczowa Madonna, by Elżbieta Podleśna, 2019. The Black Madonna of Czestochowa
is a national icon in Poland, demonstrating the Catholic Church’s importance to the survival of
Polish culture amidst (in this case, German) occupation. Podleśna’s depiction of the icon with
rainbow halos prompted Poland’s Ministry of Justice, led by Zbieniew Ziobro, to arrest her for
“violating religious feelings,” a violation of Poland’s Blasphemy Law. (Wikimedia Commons,
https://bit.ly/3ynSR1T)
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Figure I: The National Theater, by Gábor Atlasz, 2011. Atlasz was one of several artists
contracted by the Hungarian Academy of Arts to create pro-government artworks for display in
prominent art galleries. This painting depicts a heavily romanticized police officer striking down
an angelic Fidesz supporter during the 2006 riots after the leaked Gyurcsány speech. St.
Stephen, Imre Nagy, Lajos Kossuth, and other Hungarian “martyrs” look on in horror.
(https://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2011/11/08/horror-fourteen-pictures-to-accompanythe-new-hungarian-basic-laws)
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Figure J: Woodcuts carved in the shape of Hungary’s pre-Trianon borders on display at a local
festival, with writing in ancient Magyar runes and other national symbols apparent. These crafts
have been subsidized heavily by Fidesz through the National Cultural Fund (István Povedák,
2013).
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Figure K: The title card of “Inwazja,” a thirty-minute documentary broadcast on Polish state
TV, 2020. The film claims to follow an undercover reporter investigating alleged foreign ties
between prominent LGBT+ rights NGOs and the European Union. Likely sponsored by PiS, the
documentary was eventually taken offline after the NGO Campaign Against Homophobia
successfully filed a libel suit against the filmmakers. (Juliette Bretan, Notes from Poland,
https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/06/08/court-orders-polish-state-broadcaster-tvp-to-takedown-online-anti-lgbt-film )

Figure L: One of the hundredss of billboards Fidesz has placed in Budapest in the months
leading up to the 2022 Parliamentary elections specifically appealing to anti-LGBT+ sentiment.
The billboard roughly translates to “Are you afraid of child sexual propaganda? Complete the
National Consultation!” a reference to the recently passed Anti-Pedophile Act. (This photo was
sent to me by a friend living in Budapest.)
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Figure M: Stickers labeled “LGBT Free Zone,” distributed to subscribers of the conservative
magazine Gazeta Polska. The magazine, like many local media outlets, is heavily funded by Law
and Justice. (Jaap Ariens, NBC, https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/conservative-polishmagazine-issues-lgbt-free-zone-stickers-n1033471 )
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Figure N: Far-right nationalists attempt to light an apartment with an LGBT+ Pride Flag and
Strajk Kobiet banner on fire, Warsaw, November 11th, 2020. The nationalists, rallying around
celebrations of Poland’s Independence Day, marched under the slogan “Our Civilization, Our
Rules,” and had multiple clashes with the police. The apartment building depicted was
eventually set alight. Like other far-right demonstrations, the Polish government has done little
to prevent violence, and several leaders have even encouraged it. (Daniel Tilles, Notes from
Poland).

